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Canadian Lawyers 
A Peculiar Professionalism 
HARRY W. ARTHURS, RICHARD WE ISM AN, 
AND FREDERICK H. ZEMANS 
Canada is a federal state, embracing two official languages and legal 
cultures and ten provincial jurisdictions. Its lawyers are dispersed across 
3,000 miles in diverse social settings and economic circumstances, but their 
functions are not formally defined or faithfully recorded. Our attempt to 
capture a complex reality is made especially difficult because of the ex-
treme paucity of secondary writing on the Canadian legal profession. 
These caveats notwithstanding, we believe that Canadian materials may, 
indeed, contribute to current theorizing about the professions. 
Students of the sociology of law (e.g., Abel, 1981; Heinz & Laumann, 
1983) recently have begun to develop an historical and comparative ap-
proach to the legal profession, complementing the valuable work of Freid-
son (1970), Johnson (1972), and Larson (1977) on the more general prob-
lem of the professions. Central to this approach is the assumption that "all 
occupations under capitalism are compelled to seek market control, the 
attainment of which is the defining characteristic of a profession" (Abel, 
1981: 1120). 
Freidson, in his seminal work on the sociology of medicine (1970), 
distinguished professions from other occupations by virtue of their po-
sition of hegemonic privilege in the division of labor. Larson (1977) saw 
two elements as crucial to the professional project: the creation of a 
systematic body of knowledge on which to ground claims to exclusive 
competence and the achievement of control over the production of pro-
ducers of this knowledge. Because the university emphasized formal train-
ing, espoused meritocratic standards, and enjoyed high public credibility, 
it became the primary vehicle by which professional organizations could 
attain these objectives. 
Several ambitious recent attempts to track the professional project point 
to a decline in professional dominance. Abel suggests that both in England 






124 Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans 
significant control over the supply of legal services and that the defensive 
strategies, by which it has sought to regain control, have been markedly 
ineffective. Heinz and Laumann (1983) also offer evidence of professional 
transformation and decline by describing the increasingly sharp division 
of the metropolitan bar into mutually exclusive subgroups based on 
function, income, ethnicity, and education. The rapid shift from private 
practice to employment in both the public and private sectors may be 
further evidence of departure from the professional ideal, in which mem-
bers exercise control over the terms and conditions of their work (Abel, 
1981: 1159-1160). Similar trends toward a loss of both market control and 
autonomy have been observed in medicine, although the causes of de-
professionalization differ (Coburn et al., 1983; McKinlay & Arches, 1985). 
If the theories of Freidson, Larson, and Abel are to have general ex-
planatory value, they must be able to accommodate contexts other than 
the American experience from which they were primarily drawn. Can a 
theory of the political economy of the professions transcend national 
boundaries? Local political forms, culture, economic circumstance, and 
social organization, and especially the notorious parochialism of formal 
law, all would seem to argue against this. Canada's transformation from an 
agrarian colony to a modem industrial nation during the formative period 
of professionalism especially might be expected to yield a distinctive 
pattern, unlike that of the two countries that most influenced its pro-
fessional history-England and the United States. Given these consider-
ations, the wonder is not that the Canadian experience seems to invite 
modification of the "professional project" thesis but rather that it seems 
generally to confirm it. 
TERMINOLOGY 
In general padance, legal practitioners everywhere in Canada are called 
"lawyers" (" avocats" in Quebec). The historical distinction between barris-
ters and solicitors no longer has any functional significance (see, e.g., Law 
Society Ad, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 233, s. 28; Barristers and Solicitors 
Ad, Rev. Stat. Nova Scotia 1967, c. 18 ss. 3-5; Barristers and Solicitors 
Ad, Rev. Stat. British Columbia 1979, c. 26, s. 42). In Quebec "notaires" 
are concerned with the formalization, authentication, and preservation of 
title documents, wills, and other legal instruments.1 Lawyers who perform 
adjudicative or regulatory functions may suspend or terminate their formal 
professional membership and will be referred to thereafter as judges, 
members of a board or commission, and so on. 2 A purely honorific title, 
"Queen's Counsel," has been awarded to a rather large number of lawyers 
in some provinces, (such as Ontario), and fewer in others. It does not signal 
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preeminence in advocacy (as it does in England) but merely some degree 
of seniority and professional or public repute-if anything.3 
Lawyers perform a variety of tasks, many of which require little or no 
specialized training but are functionally related to. others that do (Colvin, 
1979; Macfarlane, 1980; Colvin et al., 1978). The two historic functions of 
lawyers, conveyancing and litigation, have acquired an extended meaning. 
For Canadian lawyers, the modem analogue to "conveyancing" is the prac-
tice of commerical law, which includes the negotiation, drafting, and inter-
pretation of commercial documents; advising and planning for commercial 
transactions; corporate and tax planning; and general business and political 
advice. Lawyers also advise individual, nonbusiness clients about family 
relationships, financial affairs, dealings with government over pensions, 
and other benefits and employment contracts. 
"Litigation" in the strict sense includes representation of parties in a 
dispute that will be adjudicated by a court. It now also encompasses repre-
sentation before government regulatory. regimes, interpretation of existing 
legislation, attempts to change legislation, and contacts with the media. 
A small but growing group of lawyers is concerned with the "scientific 
jobs" in law. These include not only legal academics but also employees of 
government departments, law reform commissions, research staffs of cor-
porations and community groups and specialist researchers in large law 
firms. Finally, some lawyers are deeply involved in political and admin-
istrative functions that seldom engage the skills employed by those in 
private practice. Corporate and governmental administrators, lobbyists, 
journalists, and elected officials are found along the broad spectrum of 
these "nonlegal" occupations. 
The more attenuated the connection with the original knowledge base 
of lawyer functions, the more likely it is that nonlawyers will be important 
actors in the same field (Colvin, 1979; Quinn, 1978; Evans & Trebilcock, 
1982); thus, business advice often involves accountants. Lay persons are 
advocates in many tribunals not mandated to administer conventional 
legal rules. The development of "legal science" increasingly attracts the 
participation of economists, sociologists, scientists, and philosophers. Law-
yers are not even dominant in public policy development and administra-
tion (Marmour & White, 1978; Ronson, 1978; Altman & Weil, Inc., 1980). 
In matters more closely related to conveyancing and litigation, how-
ever, lawyers tend to assume an exclusive or dominant role. "Law clerks" 
or "legal assistants" typically work under the supervision of qualified 
lawyers (Tarnan, 1978; Zemans, 1982). Sometimes they are given consider-
able latitude in preparing routine documents and prosecuting legal pro-
ceedings, especially in minor matters (see table 1). "Community legal 
workers," "lay advocates," or "paralegals" perform analogous functions in 
legal aid offices (Gold, 1978; Thomasset, 1981; Taylor, 1981; Zemans, 
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1982).4 Typically, however, the latter enjoy rather greater autonomy, 
particularly in areas such as community mobilization and legal education. 
Neither "law clerks" nor "community legal workers" need have any partic-
ular training or formal credentials, although courses and training programs 
are available (Marmor & White, 1978; Ronson, 1978).5 
Accountants, trade union representatives, and others do have limited 
rights of audience in certain forums, 6 and they may negotiate, draft, and 
interpret certain legal documents as long as they do not engage in the 
"practice of law." Their activities typically involve immigration, labor 
relations, social welfare, and landlord-tenant problems, but they also 
extend to taxation, estate planning, and the financial and corporate transac-
tions of middle-class and corporate clients. In some jurisdictions, patent 
attorneys or patent agents may practice industrial property law (Patent 
Ad, Rev. Stat. Canada, 1970, c. 203, s. 15), "conveyancers" perform title 
searches and related functions (Trebilcock & Reiter, 1982: 101), notaries 
public and notaires authenticate documents, and commissioners swear affi-
davits (Schloesser, 1979). 
SOCIOGRAPHIC DATA AND SOCIAL POSITION 
NUMBERS 
The following data describe lawyers who are licensed to practice, but an 
increasing proportion of those who obtain a professional qualification do 
not enter private practice. In Ontario, the most populous province, the 
proportion of graduates entering private practice declined from 86 percent 
to 70 percent over a period of about ten years, while the number of qual-
ified lawyers doubled (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1983b). 
In 1982 there were about 39,000 lawyers in Canada (including Quebec 
notaires) (Canadian Law List, 1983). This represents significant: growth 
since the mid-1960s as well as a significant decline in the ratio of popu-
lation to lawyers. In Ontario, the ratio fell from 1,142 in 1960 to 574 in 
1981 (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1983b: 227). Between 1931and1981 
the number of lawyers expanded much more rapidly (278 percent) than 
that of physicians (183 percent) or dentists (123 percent), although slightly 
less rapidly than that of architects (309 percent). 
These changes seem to have resulted in part from a demographic 
anomaly. The fow numbers entering the profession in the 1940s and 1950s 
produced equally low numbers of retirements and deaths in the 1970s and 
1980s. The birth rate peaked at 27.6 live births per 1,000 population 
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between 1956 and 1960 and then declined to a low of 15.5 in J.977. The 
combination of these two factors amplified the drop in the ratio of popu-
lation to lawyers. There was little change in the popularity of law studies 
among university students, however: They attracted 2.2 percent of total 
enrollment in 1962 and 2.9 percent from 1973 to 1983 (Consultative 
Group on Research and Education in Law, 1983). Nonetheless, because 
the changes occurred after a protracted period of stability (Stager, 1982), 
they have come to be perceived (especially in professional circles) as un-
precedented. In fact, they seem to be part of a long-term trend in which 
episodes of rapid expansion alternate with lengthy periods when the sup-
ply remains constant or contracts (Neiligan, 1950; 1951). 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION 
Two provinces contain nearly two-thirds of all Canadian lawyers; three 
contain nearly four-fifths (see table 2). Lawyers are clustered in the most 
economically advanced and densely populated parts of the country and in 
government centers (Berger, 1979). Winnipeg contains almost 80 percent 
of Manitoba lawyers, and Edmonton and Calgary combined contain more 
than 80 percent of Alberta's lawyers, although only half of the population 
(Statistics Canada, 1981). Toronto, a provincial capital and the commercial 
center of the country, located in the midst of the industrial heartland, 
contains about 10 percent of the population but about 25 percent of all 
lawyers. Conversely, small towns in remote areas often have few lawyers 
and almost certainly a much higher ratio of population to lawyers than is 
found in the major metropolises. 
DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE PROFESSION 
There also are considerable differences between metropolitan and non-
metropolitan practice and even between the city core and suburbs (Berger, 
1979; Mullagh, 1977; Snider, 1981; Colvin et al., 1978). General practi-
tioners predominate outside metropolitan centers (Berger, 1979; Ribordy, 
1982a: 83). This is partly because there are too few people to support 
specialization and partly because specialists tend to perform services on 
behalf of governments, corporations, and other institutional clients, whose 
head offices often are located in the larger cities. Almost all medium-sized 
and large law firms are located in the central business and financial districts 
of the larger cities. Lawyers catering to a ''household clientele" tend to be 
found increasingly in suburban shopping precincts and in storefronts in 
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working-class and ethnic districts (Colvin et al., 1978: 25- 220). Outside 
the central business districts, small firms and solo practitioners predomi-
nate (Arthurs et al., 1971; Berger, 1979). 
Identifiable subgroups of lawyers outside private practice have emerged 
recently. While there were only some 40 law teachers in all of Canada as 
recently as 1950, the number now has grown to over 650 (Consultative 
Group on Research and Education in Law, 1983: 30). Government lawyers 
working at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels have experienced a 
similarly dramatic increase in numbers. The Province of Ontario em-
ployed approximately 6 lawyers in the Ministry of the Attorney General 
in 1945; by 1981 the ministry's head office employed 150 and local Crown 
attorneys' (prosecutors') offices another 500 (Leal, 1982). In the later year, 
1,098 out of 15,011 Ontario lawyers were employed by various levels 
of government (Stager, 1981). Community clinic lawyers in Ontario in-
creased from 18 in 1976 to 60 in 1983 (Zemans, 1980). Across the country 
legal aid services employed 534 lawyers in 1979/80 (National Legal Aid 
Research Centre, 1980/81). Corporate staff lawyers (sometimes called 
"house counsel") have expanded their numbers greatly, especially in 
the past ten years (Feltham & Campin, 1981). Finally, several hundred 
lawyers work for community groups, trade unions, legal aid or legal 
services schemes, and advocacy organizations such as the Environmental 
Law Association or the Civil Liberties Association-forms of practice that 
were almost nonexistent fifteen years ago. 
THE NUMBERS DEBATE 
The relatively rapid increase in the number of lawyers admitted to practice, 
especially during the past five to ten years, has produced a widespread 
conviction among members of the bar (and some members of the public) 
that there are "too many lawyers." 7 In the absence of any other standard 
for measuring the appropriate number of lawyers, this belief typically is 
supported by reference to the alleged stagnation or decline in lawyer 
incomes in recent years. It is by no means clear how incomes have been 
affected by rising numbers, however. In fact, with considerable variation 
by type of practice, seniority, clientele, and location, Canadian lawyers 
have managed to maintain their relatively advantaged position (Altman & 
Weil, Inc., 1982; Financial Post 20 [20 November, 1982)). And to the extent 
they have not done so, the cause appears to be recent reversals in Canada's 
economic fortunes (Stager, 1982: 116-118; Ribordy, 1982b; 1983). During 
a period in the early 1980s when the economy was running considerably 
under capacity, unemployment in many industries was high, real estate and 
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other commercial markets were depressed, and business expansion was 
negligible, it was not surprising that lawyer incomes would suffer. 
Fluctuation in lawyer incomes is difficult to measure. Average annual 
incomes may, indeed, have remained relatively stable, which would signify 
an actual decline after adjusting for inflation; however, this may be at-
tributable to the large influx of relatively low earning recent graduates. 
There is no evidence that the real earnings of senior "elite" lawyers have 
suffered. On the contrary: for reasons that will be discussed below, the 
present economic situation may well have amplified existing disparities, 
to the prejudice of new entrants, solo practitioners and small firms, law-
yers serving a "household clientele" or legally-aided clients, and salaried 
lawyers (see table 3). 
A second ingredient in the "numbers debate" is the allegation that 
incompetence has increased (Yachetti, 1983 ). Because lawyers must cut 
prices to compete, it is argued, they also will trim the quality of service 
provided. Moreover, lawyers whose traditional sources of business (e.g., 
real estate transactions) have diminished will be tempted to try types of 
legal practice (e.g., criminal law) in which they are not experienced. These 
allegations remain unsubstantiated. While the latter suggestion seems 
plausible, the former is at odds with the fact that the recent significant in-
creases in claims for incompetence result from the activities of experienced 
lawyers and from errors committed by them during a period of consider-
able prosperity (Law $ociety of Upper Canada, 1983b). Indeed, one com-
mentator has argued that too few lawyers trying to satisfy too much de-
mand also may produce incompetent performances (Stager, 1982: 33-34). 
Regardless of the facts, it is undeniable that many lawyers favor limiting 
entry (Yachetti, 1983: 105). However, it is by no means clear that the 
profession possesses the power to give effect to this view. While the 
applicability of antitrust legislation to the legal profession is uncertain 
(Hunter, 1983), any attempt by the bar to restrict numbers probably would 
result in considerable public outcry (Law Society of Upper Canada, 
1983b: 234, 238). Governments facing financial constraint might be will-
ing to trim the number of graduating law students in order to save both 
the cost of legal education and claims on legal aid funds, however, since 
younger lawyers rely more heavily on such work (Berger, 1979: 49-50). 
Finally, the impact of market forces has been felt ·most severely by 
recent graduates, who have suffered periods of unemployment or been 
displaced into nonlegal careers in business, government, or elsewhere 
(Stager, I 982; Zemans, 1986; Consultative Group on Research and Edu-
cation in Law, 1983 ). At present, however, law schools continue to 
enjoy a vast surplus of highly qualified applicants for the limited number of 
places. 
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CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
Legal Connections 
Lawyers generally identify closely with, and tend to support, legal insti-
tutions such as the courts and organizations such as the Bar Association; 
however, judges may inspire deference or criticism (or both) rather than 
close collegiality. Law professors may consider themselves as either critics 
of "the system" or deferential to authority (Laskin, 1972). In addition, 
government officials, legal aid and clinic lawyers, tribunal members, and 
other lawyers employed by nonlegal employers are .exposed to centrifugal 
influences by virtue of their identification with the institutions or organiza-
tions where they work. 
Nonlegal Connections 
Some specialist practitioners maintain close connections with other pro-
fessions with which they collaborate. For example, physicians and lawyers 
comprise the membership of the Medical-Legal Society (MacEachem, 
1976t and lawyers and accountants belong to the Canadian Tax Foun-
dation. Much more common, however, are the involvements of lawyers 
with their business clients because of annual retainers (sometimes reflecting 
decades of close association), the acceptance of directorships, participation 
in active management, and partnerships or coventure arrangements. Law-
yers also often serve as lobbyists, informal intermediaries, and a responsive 
audience for their business clients (Clement, 1975b; Galt 1977; Pike, 1980; 
Adam & Lahey, 1981). 
Lawyers maintain connections with political parties, religious and ethnic 
groups, and special-interest groups such as consumers' associations, credit 
unions, and conservation and civil rights organizations. While this some-
times may be motivated by a desire to attract business, it often reflects a 
genuine and intense involvement in the cause espoused by the organi-
zation. Lawyers constitute important links among the widest variety of 
institutions, social sectors, and political perspectives. Indeed, this "linkage" 
function may be seen as divided loyalty, which may help to explain why 
lawyers so often are viewed with suspicion by the nonlawyers with whom 
they are associated. 
LAWYERS AND POLITICS 
Lawyers are extensively involved in politics (Pasis, 1970; Jackson & At-
kinson, 1980; Goodman, 1971; Porter, 1965). Between 1930 and 1985, six 
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of the nine prime ministers were lawyers (including one, Pierre E. Trudeau, 
who was a law professor). Together they held office for thfrty-five of the 
fifty-five years. Significant numbers of federal cabinet ministe;s, provincial 
premiers and cabinet ministers, and legislators have been lawyers. While 
the proportion of elected officials who are entrepreneurs, teachers, and 
members of other occupations is increasing, lawyers remain vastly over-
represented in all Canadian political contexts. For example, 25 percent of 
the members of the federal House of Commons were lawyers in 1983, a 
higher proportion than in the British Parliament (17 percent in 197 4) or the 
German Bundestag (5 percent in 1972) (Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 
1983; Jackson & Atkinson, 1980: 156). Survey evidence indicates that a 
majority of the public prefer legislators who are lawyers (Samac, 1985). 
·Moreover, politics is more easily combined with law than with other 
careers (Porter, 1965: 393). 
Lawyers also are deeply involved in party politics as campaign man-
agers, policy advisers, and strategists. They have not dominated senior 
policy positions and administrative positions in government, however, 
with two exceptions: (1) administrators performing adjudicative functions 
frequently are lawyers; and (2) Royal Commissions, often used in develop-
ing major policy initiatives, tend to be chaired by serving or retired judges. 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOW ARD THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The public is ambivalent toward lawyers. On one hand, it views them as 
untrustworthy; on the other hand, it respects Supreme Court judges; and 
those who have used lawyers' services are very satisfied; (Yale, 1982; 
More, 1982; but see Moore, 1980). There is ample literary evidence that 
Canadians dislike legalism, the aggressive and obfuscatory style of lawyers, 
and their apparent influence (Robins, 1971; Farris, 1972). Canadians also 
view themselves as law-abiding; they recently adopted a constitutional 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Russell, 1982; Arthurs, 1984), and they 
are quick to assume that "there ought to be a law" to deal with perceived 
social, economic, and even cultural problems. 
In one important-respect, however, Canadian lawyers have at least 
avoided attracting public censure, if they have not won public approba-
tion. The introduction of legal aid in Canada proceeded without significant 
professional opposition, even with professional acquiescence and occa-
sional support. Jn some provinces, the profession advocated the establish-
ment of legal aid in order to win the right to administer the plan. By 
contrast, the medical profession resolutely opposed the introduction of 
medical insw·ance and has continued to criticize it, seek ways of working 
outside it, and encourage public opposition to the notion of "state medi-
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cine." Ironically, none of these maneuvers appears to have damaged public 
admiration for, and trust in, physicians. 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF LAWYERS 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Canada is a country of considerable ethnic diversity, especially since 
World War II (Richmond, 1967). Whereas members of ethnic minorities 
and disadvantaged groups in the United States gained entry to the pro-
fession through unaccredited, low-status, part-time law schools, no such 
route existed in Canada. In most provinces, there was-and is-only a 
single law school (two at most) rather closely identified with the provincial 
professional body. Full-time legal education became universal in Canada 
after World War II, largely as a result of pressure from within the academic 
community striving to improve standards, rather than (as has been sug-
gested in the United States) (Auerbach, 1976) as a result of professional 
attempts to preclude entry by unwanted minorities (Bucknall et al., 1968; 
Laskin, 1983). There is no obvious national hierarchy of schools, however, 
although some are favored by geographic location or historical circum-
stance (Adam & Lahey, 1981: 685). Most students attend law school in 
their home province or in the nearest province with a law school and, once 
called to the bar, rarely move to another province to practice law (see table 
4). There is, therefore, no Canadian counterpart to the American elite law 
schools, whose graduates may clearly be identified by their social back-
grounds or professional careers. 
AGE 
Because various Canadian provinces offer eleven, twelve, or thirteen years 
of primary and secondary education and because various jurisdictions 
require from two to four years of prelaw university education, the age for 
beginning law studies varies considerably. Every province requires a three-
year law degree, however, together with some period of service under 
articles (apprenticeship). In addition, most provinces require systematic 
practical instruction in law, either contemporaneous with, before, or after 
articling: The minimum age for entry to practice thus is between twenty-
four and twenty-seven. Indeed, since most law students have at least a first 
degree in some other field, many have pursued graduate studies in other 
disciplines or other careers, and some undertake graduate studies in law 
before entering practice, the actual age of entry is much higher than the 
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minimum (McKennirey, 1983: 124; Levy, 1972: 12, 23-25; Huxter, 1981). 
Still, the rapid growth of the profession recently has rendered it much 
more youthful (see table 5). 
GENDER 
Although Canada was the first country in the British Empire to admit 
women to legal practice (in 1896) (Harvey, 1970), the number of women in 
law school remained minuscule until about 1970. Women now constitute 
35 percent of new entrants in most jurisdictions (Berger, 1979; Zemans, 
1986: 20-21; McKennirey, 1983: 3) and 15 percent of all lawyers (see 
table 6). 
As a result of conscious effort, women have been appointed in increas-
ing numbers to law faculties, boards, commissions, and courts (including 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which now has its first female puisne judge). 
They rose from 4.4 percent of full-time law teachers in 1971/72 to 14.2 
percent in 1982/83; however, they still are not well represented in the elite 
of the legal profession (Guppy & Siltanen, 1977; Huxter, 1981; Adam, 
1981). Male judges and magistrates outnumbered female by more than 
eight to one in 1981-more than nineteen to one on the federal bench. 
Nor are women found in proportionate numbers in all types of practices. 
ETHNICITY 
There is a clear preponderance in the legal profession of members of the 
well-established charter groups: French Catholics in Quebec and English 
Protestants in the rest of Canada (Adam & Lahey, 1971; Arthurs et al., 
1971: 500 ff.; Cadres Professionels, Inc., 1968). Some of the more es-
tablished immigrant groups have managed to achieve significant repre-
sentation within the profession on a local or regional basis, however, 
sometimes far in excess of their numbers within the general population-
English Protestants in Montreal and Jews in several metropolitan centers. 
Children of newer immigrant groups, such as Italians and Ukrainians, also 
are beginning to appear in discernible numbers. Some of the most recent 
arrivals, such as West Indians and Asians, Portuguese and Greeks, still are 
significantly underrepresented, and despite conscious efforts to recruit and 
support native law students, their numbers remain very small (Univer-
sity of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1981). Students from non-
metropolitan areas doubtless end up practicing law in the largest cities, 
while relatively few seem to migrate in the opposite direction. 
134 Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans 
CLASS 
Historically, law has claimed to be an "open profession." Indeed, one of its 
functions (reflected in the early requirements) may have been the recruit-
ment, socialization, and certification of members of an incipient "new 
upper class" of considerable importance in colonial society (Baker, 1983; 
Smith & T epperman, 197 4). 
For at least the past generation, however, entry into the legal pro-
fession, and especially access to its most prestigious positions, has been 
enjoyed disproportionately by individuals from professional families and 
other privileged socioeconomic groups (Arthurs et al., 1971; Levy, 1972; 
Lajoie aI).d Parizeau, 1976; Adam & Lahey, 1981). Indeed, entry into the 
professions generally, and into other elites, has not been significantly 
democratized, largely because recent immigrant groups, the poor, and 
other disadvantaged minorities have been unable to overcome educational 
and financial barriers (Clement, 1975b; Porter, 1965; Newman, 1975). 
These barriers have been raised by increasing competition to enter law 
school since the 1960s and by the more recent downturn in the °Canadian 
economy. Individuals from disadvantaged circumstances are found in 
diminishing numbers as one ascends the educational ladder (Porter, 1979; 
Cuneo & Curtis, 1975). Costs have risen as well: law school fees ranged 
from Can$340 to Can$625 in 1966/67 but were between Can$808 and 
Can$1,615 in 1984/85. 
Many law schools have sought to admit mature students who have not 
attended university, native peoples, and other qualified individuals whose 
credentials may have been adversely affected by social or economic cir-
cumstances (McKennirey, 1983 ). Within the profession, meritocratic crite-
ria have enabled some highly qualified individuals to attain legal positions 
from which they previously would have been excluded. 
STRATIFICATION WITHIN THE PROFESSION 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant males are overrepresented in large corpo-
rate law firms, not only in English Canada but also in the predominately 
French city of Montreal, and Jews, Catholics, members of ethnic minorities, 
and women are underrepresented (Adam & Lahey, 1981; Arthurs et al., 
1971: 51°6-518). There is a tendency toward ghettoization, however, es-
pecially within the "household sector" of legal practice. ''Ethnics," partic-
ularly Jews, have tended disproportionately to practice in such areas as 
criminal law, real estate, service to small businesses, and domestic relations 
(Colvin et al., 1978; Arthurs et al., 1971: 512- 513, 517). 
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STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
HISTORY 
The history of the legal profession differs considerably from province to 
province; the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec is the most obvious special 
case (Lortie, 1975; Sinclair, 1975; Lachance, 1966; Buchanan, 1925). During 
the early period most of the very few lawyers were foreign trained. Some 
came directly from the United Kingdom, some were loyalist ernigres from 
postrevolutionary America, and others (especially judges and law officers) 
served in Canada before or after other colonial postings (Parker, J 982; 
MacAlister, 1928; Riddell, 1928). 
In the older colonies such as Nova Scotia and Upper Canada (Ontario), 
local professional bodies soon assumed regulatory functions in imitation of 
the English Inns of Court, acting sometimes under statutory mandate and 
sometimes under executive control and direction Uohnston, 1972; Sm'i.th, 
1948; Riddell, 1928; MacAlister, 1928). When there were few trained 
lawyers available, a considerable amount of legal business was conducted 
by nonqualified functionaries such as conveyancers and notaries (Gibson & 
Gibson, 1972). Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the pro-
fession gradually asserted its monopoly (Newman, 197 4; Orkin, 1971; 
Hawkins, 1978; Cole, 1983). Yet as late as the midtwentieth century, 
lay magistrates were being appointed in Ontario, the most heavily urban-
ized and legally most advanced of the common law jurisdictions. 
The professional body in each province, often called the "Law Society," 
exercised licensing functions, set standards of admission and professional 
conduct, and disciplined misconduct. It also retained active control of legal 
education until the late nineteenth century and dominated it thereafter by 
the joint or sole proprietorship of law schools, specification of formal 
educational requirements, and informal articulation of what lawyers /1 ought 
to know" (Bucknall et al., 1968; Laskin, 1983; Baker, 1983: 68). 
The "numbers problem" first surfaced in the 1830s and 1840s, when 
lawyers and others complained about overproduction in Upper Canada. 
Until the midnineteenth century, law was a relatively "open" profession, 
in which lax standards of entry (several years of apprenticeship) posed 
no serious obstacles. Thereafter, more rigorous educational requirements 
alternated with periods of relative (even total) laxity, reflecting diver-
gent views about whether the Law Society should pursue its project of 
professional socialization through formal or informal, centralized or de-
centralized, training schemes. 
From the end of the nineteenth century, Law Societies (outside Ontario) 
exhibited declining interest in legal education. In many jurisdictions they 
gradually ceded to the universities responsibility for formal instruction in 
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law, but everywhere they retained control over entry through a required 
period of apprenticeship. These changing educational requirements had, 
and sometimes were perceived to have had, an adverse impact on access to 
the profession by poor students, those from outlying areas, and foreign 
lawyers who had emigrated to Canada (Baker, 1983; Bucknall et al., 1968). 
During the Great Depression this impact was considerable, especially since 
it-coincided with the general impoverishment of universities. 
In the years following World War II, however, provincial law societies 
have been involved only marginally in providing basic legal education 
(Laskin, 1983: 153; Arnup, 1982; Bucknall et al., 1968). Today, professional 
associations focus on three matters: (1) "practical" ·professional education 
immediately prior to admission and on a continuing basis thereafter; (2) 
regulatory functions, especially those connected with the protection of 
client funds and other aspects of lawyer honesty and, to a lesser extent, 
those directed toward maintaining intraprofessional relations; and (3) pub-
lic functions, including the management of legal aid schemes, dissemina-
tion of public information about law, protection of the professional mo-
nopoly, and lobbying on behalf of the legal profession. 
THE SCOPE OF PRACTICE 
The right to define the scope of practice is no less valuable a prerogative in 
protecting the professional monopoly than is the regulation of entry. The 
Canadian legal profession uses the same device as its counterpart in the 
·United States, namely, statutory provisions against unauthorized practice. 
Until recently, the clear trend has been to extend the jurisdictional claims 
of lawyers across a wide spectrum of practice situations-from advocacy 
to the preparation of documents intended to have legal effect and ulti-
mately to legal advice (Davies, 1952: 25; Orkin, 1957: 248-253; see, e.g., 
Law Society Act, Rev. Stat. Manitoba 1970, c. Ll00.5.48 [2] [7]. The fad 
that most statutes permit people to ad on their own behalf or as unre-
munerated agents does little to dispel the suspicion that restrictions on 
practice have less to do with protecting consumers than with protecting 
markets. 
Certain exemptions or limited rights to "practice" have been granted, 
explicitly or by acquiescence, to occupations that could not function if the 
statutory provisions were enforced literally. Some provinces exempt insur-
ance claims adjusters and real estate agents as long as they function within 
narrowly defined limits; others allow public officials to draft legal docu-
ments (e.g., Legal Profession Ad, Rev. Stat. Alberta 1980, c. L-9, s. 93 [2] 
[a]; Barristers and Solicitors Ad, Rev. Stat. British Columbia 1979, c. 26, 
s. I; see Colvin et al., 1978). Provinciai statutes authorize the appearance of 
"agents" before small claims cou_rts and administrative agencies (e.g., Statu-
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tory Powers Procedures Act, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 484; Rules of the 
Provincial Court, Ontario Leg. 797 / 84). And federal legislation allows lay 
representati<,m in minor criminal matters (Criminal Code, Rev. Stat. Can. 
1970, c. C-34 s. 735). Rights of audience are widely exercised by trade 
union officials before labor boards, accountants before taxation tribunals, 
and more generally by law clerks and articled students (apprentices) em-
ployed by law firms. 
In "gray areas" that the monopoly does not clearly reach, explicit 
jurisdictional understandings ensure due regard for professional interests. 
Trust companies thus are allowed to draw wills, provided they are "re-
viewed" by private practitioners, and community clinics may dispense 
legal advice and service in less important matters through law students and 
lay advocates, if significant remunerative work is forwarded to qualified 
private practitioners. 
Judicial interpretation of jurisdictional statutes also has tended to en-
large the protected scope of professional practice. The preparation of 
papers for probate, the drawing of wills, the drafting of legal documents by 
a collection agency, applications for incorporation, and the processing of 
uncontested divorces all have been designated "unauthorized practice" 
when performed for gain by a nonlawyer, even in the absence of compel-
ling statutory language (e.g., R. v. Engel and Seaway Divorcing Service 
(1974], 11 0.R. [2d] 343). A recent ruling appears to set some limits on the 
legal monopoly, however, by requiring that activities be reserved to 
lawyers only if it can be demonstrated that the public otherwise would be 
placed at risk (R. v. Nicholson (1979], 96 D.L.R. [3d] 693 [Alta. C.A.]). 
Legal action against "unauthorized practice" typically is initiated by law 
societies, which usually intervene at the request of a member. There is 
some indication that the adverse market conditions of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s are reflected in an increasing number of complaints received 
by the unauthorized practice committees of professional bodies. In On-
tario, for example, ten to sixteen complaints were received annually be-
tween 1968 and 1973; during the next eight years this increased to thirty-
five to ninety per year (Professional Orgnaizations Committee, 1980: 242). 
It should be noted that most complaints are either diverted or negotiated. 
Very few lead to actual prosecution. Because of the transparent element of 
professional self-interest, an Ontario commission recently recommended 
that no prosecution for unauthorized practice be commenced except with 
the written consent of the attorney general of the province (ibid.). 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNT ABILITY 
Despite the success of provincial Law Societies in dominating the market 
for legal services, the professional hegemony of Canadian lawyers has not 
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gone entirely unchallenged. Both the demand from professional groups 
that provincial legislatures mediate jurisdictional disputes and attempts 
by several occupational associations to secure certification or licensure 
regimes have caused governments to reevaluate their policies toward the 
professions in general. Moreover, governments have been increasingly 
responsive to appeals from consumer groups for greater accountability by 
the professions. Although public debate has focused on the organization 
and financing of the health occupations, the position of the bar in the 
division of labor also has been examined by several governmental com-
missions and inquiries over the past fifteen year~ (Royal Commission 
Inquiry into Civil Rights, 1968; Commission of Inquiry on Health and 
Social Welfare, 1970; Economic Council of Canada, 1969; Professional 
Organizations Committee, 1980). 
No province has gone further than Quebec in modifying the relation-
ship between the state and the professions. In 1973, several years after a 
provincial Royal Commission spoke extensively to the issues, Quebec 
enacted a Professional Code, which formally expanded public control over 
all professional groups, including the bar, far beyond the controls prevail-
ing in other provinces (Stat. Quebec 1973, c. 43). The central innovation is 
the organization of all professions into corporations with parallel mandates 
and the subordination of these corporations to an overarching provincial 
Professions Board, all of whose members belong to some profession but 
are appointed by the provincial cabinet. The board ensures that each 
profession fulfills its statutory obligations, approves regulations proposed 
by the professions, including fee schedules, and publishes decisions in 
disciplinary cases. A provincial Professions Tribunal hears appeals from the 
disciplinary tribunal of each body. Although other provinces have rejected 
these changes on the ground that they threaten the independence of the 
bar, there is little to justify this fear (lssalys, 1978; Pepin, 1979; Arthurs, 
1982). 
A much more typical response to demands for professional account-
ability has been to leave the bar's historic governing structures essentially 
intact while engrafting additional elements designed to provide the public 
symbolic reassurance but no real control (Arthurs, 1982). The experience 
of Ontario is instructive (Arthurs, 1971). Responding to the recommen-
dations of a Royal Commission of Inquiry, the Ontario legislature in 1970 
created a "Law Society Council," composed of representatives of the 
profession's governing body and other legal "estates" as well as some 
public members and charged with reporting to the legislature annually 
about how the profession discharged its public responsibilities. Lacking a 
fixed agenda, its own secretariat, and public members with identifiable 
constituencies, the council soon ceased to function. Jn its place, the legisla-
ture mandated the direct appointment of four lay members to the govern-
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ing body (about 10 percent of its membership). Hostages to fortune, and 
no more influential than their individual exertions and talents dictate, these 
lay members have largely deflected public demand for further state con-
trol of the profession without actually providing· any effective means of 
enforcing public accountability. Similarly, a statutory admonition that the 
provincial attorney general (an ex officio member of the governing body) 
should serve as guardian of the public interest has had little practical result. 
Lay membership of local and provincial legal aid committees does seem 
to give some support and direction to attempts to provide legal services to 
the poor. Public accountability seems to depend on episodic pressure from 
a variety of external sources, however: a Royal Commission or legislative 
committee investigating some aspect of professional practice or gover-
nance; newspaper editorials or legislative debates signaling concern with 
the bar's policies; occasional threats of investigation or prosecution by 
the combines (antitrust) authorities; or adverse comments on the behav-
ior of lawyers or law societies by judges, in the course of litigation or 
extrajudicially. 
Given the relatively nonintrusive and sporadic nature of these criticisms 
and demands for accountability, it is difficult to see much connection 
between the profession's virtual obsession with "independence of the bar" 
and any real threat. Rather, the shibboleth of independence is a central 
premise of professional ideology, pronounced for internal consumption 
more than to persuade an external audience. 
REGULATION OF ENTRY 
Except for a few local idiosyncracies concerning subject requirements, 
everyone with a basic credential (LLB.) from any Canadian Law school 
may complete the professional requirements for admission in any Canadian 
jurisdiction (other than Quebec, which has a civil law system). For at least 
twenty years, emphasis has been placed on the "portability" of law de-
grees among Canadian jurisdictions (Murray, 1979; Berger, 1979: 41), al-
though this is subject to several practical restraints. 
First, "portability" applies only at the moment of graduation from law 
school. The interprovincial mobility of practitioners has been inhibited by 
various measures designed to discourage either transfers or simultaneous 
practice in several jurisdictions (Murray, 1979). The recent enactment of a 
constitutional guarantee of "occupational mobility" (Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, :>. 6[2]), however, coupled with the first appearance 
of "interprovincial" law firms, may alter this position (Clarry, 1982). 
Second, even though LLB. degrees are "portable" in principle, attempts 
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graduates from inside the province. These have been only partially suc-
cessful because firms wish to hire the best available candidates. 
Third, those without Canadian credentials obviously do not benefit 
from this arrangement. Holders of foreign degrees find it very difficult to 
requalify in Canada and almost always must complete further formal edu-
cation, as well as professional training. The requirement that all entrants 
possess Canadian citizenship recenHy was challenged unsuccessfully on 
constitutional grounds (Re Skapinker [1984], 9 D.LR. [4th] 161; see Lenoir, 
1981). 
It might seem possible to control entry by regulating the number of 
articling positions, and such restrictive practices may, indeed, exist in small 
communities; however, most Law Societies have undertaken to secure 
articles for all local graduates. Likewise, except for a few well-publicized 
and atypical instances, Law Societies have not attempted to restrict entry 
by ensuring artificially high failure rates on bar admission examinations 
(Bowlby, 1982). The pass rate for the Law Society of Upper Canada's Bar 
Admission Course was 98 percent in 1973 and 99 percent in both 1979 
and 1985. 
In general, then, entry into the profession is effectively determined by 
the award of an LLB. degree. Indeed, because Canadian law schools have 
a very low failure rate (due to the high entry standards) (Browning, 1976), 
acceptance to an LLB. program virtually ensures ultimate admission to 
practice. 
Although professional bodies may exert influence on governments that 
financially support university law programs, or even on the policies of law 
faculties themselves, they do not ultimately control law school admissions . 
Canadian law schools experienced very considerable growth from the mid-
1960s through the mid-1970s (see table 7; also Consultative Group on 
Research and Education in Law, 1983: 25). Existing faculties expanded 
greaHy, and new schools were opened. Nevertheless, law students consti-
tuted about the same proportion of postsecondary students at the end of 
the period as at the beginning. 
Factors inhibiting the further growth of law faculties lay largely outside 
professional control. Law schools were reluctant to grow because of the 
difficulties of recruiting and retaining teachers, unfavorable student-faculty 
ratios, and inadequate financial suppdrt. Despite the fact that declining 
birth rates might have been expected to reduce the number of applicants 
for admission to law school by the early 1980s, fierce competition persists, 
with the·ratio of applications to available places running between 5: 1 and 
10 : 1 (see table 8). 
The unanswered question, however, is the extent to which law schools 
have internalized professional assumptions and values, unconsciously re-
sponding to the widespread desire of lawyers to limit growth during a 
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period of economic contraction (Consultative Group in Research and Educa-
tion in Law, 1983: 42). In Ontario, this desire was manifest in the response 
to a 1981 survey conducted by the Law Society, in the creation in 1983 of 
an Ontario Lawyers' Association overtly committed to limiting numbers, 
and in the prolimitation rhetoric of most candidates seeking election to the 
profession's governing body in the 1983 quadrennial election. 
This pressure was resisted at several points, however. Professional gov-
erning bodies disclaimed authority to restrict numbers and, fearing legal 
and political repercussions, were reluctant to seek necessary statutory 
changes. These governing bodies, moreover, generally are dominated by 
established practitioners who are less exposed to fluctuations in the 
economy and thus can afford the luxury of taking a principled stand in 
favor of the play of market forces. Since the level of government support 
for legal education is indirectly linked to enrollment, law faculties under-
standably are reluctant to consider entry controls. 
In any event, restriction of entry is unlikely significantly to alleviate 
economic problems within the profession in the absence of a strategy to 
redeploy existing or future practitioners to areas of potential demand 
(Stager, 1982: 134). The effect of market forces already is being felt. The 
number of lawyers in private practice is growing more slowly, and many 
new graduates (and some· established practitioners) have been diverted 
into new areas of activity, such as legal aid (Berger, 1979: 18, 49, 50), and 
especially into nonpractice roles in business, government, and elsewhere. 
Between 1971 and 1982 the proportion of Ontario lawyers in private 
practice declined from 86 percent to 71 percent (Law Society of Upper 
Canada, 1983b: 227). 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Voluntary Organizations 
Canadian Bar Association. This is the only national body of Canadian 
lawyers. It is organized into provincial branches whose membership ranges 
from the entire practicing bar in some provinces (as a result of compulsion) 
to a rather lower level in Quebec (because notaries are excluded). The 
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) performs many of its functions through 
special sections organized around areas of professional practice such as labor 
relations, estate planning, and taxation or around special interests such as 
legal education. The function of these sections is largely educational but 
also includes participation in law reform and the expression of views on 
matters of public concern or professional interest. The CBA thus ex-
pended considerable effort and funds in recent national debates over 
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constitutional changes (CBA, 1978). It also has adopted relatively liberal 
resolutions on such matters as capital punishment, abortion, search and 
seizure, and the rights of prisoners and the disabled; however, the CBA 
regularly endorses modestly conservative positions on taxation and gov-
ernment regulation of the economy. Understandably, the organizational 
behavior of the CBA and its ideology and formal public positions all seek 
to advance professional interests and values, although pronouncements 
often are couched in terms of public contribution and responsibility (Mac-
kimmie, 1963). 
In addition to these functions, the CBA traditionally has provided 
important social links, although these probably are diminishing as the 
profession expands, diversifies in functions, and stratifies in terms of social 
background and economic rewards. More important, in recent years, have 
been services to members, including insurance and pension schemes and 
advice on law office management. 
Local Lawyers' Clubs. Most communities in which lawyers practice have 
at least one organization whose membership is open to all local practi-
tioners. Almost all are devoted to parochial interests, such as social activ-
ities, seminars, and the provision of a local law library. 
At least before recent amendments arguably made antitrust legislation 
applicable to legal services (A.G. Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia 
[1982], 137 D.L.R. [3d] 1 [Sup. Ct. Can.]), it was quite common for local law 
associations to adopt minimum fee tariffs for standard transactions and 
services. In Ontario, 1 percent or 1.25 percent commonly was charged the 
purchaser or the vendor for conveying a house. Such tariff arrangements 
apparently still are enforced in small communities by social pressures. 
Local organizations also may engage in restrictive practices, such as agree-
ing not to employ articling students in order to limit competition. 
As the legality of these arrangements has been challenged (Henderson, 
1977; Posluns, 1980), local law associations have turned from direct at-
tempts to control prices to efforts to persuade provincial governing bodies 
to restrict entry and to adopt legally binding fee tariffs, breach of which 
would lead to disciplinary sanctions. 
Professional Specialist Organizations. Organizations have been formed of 
criminal lawyers, corporate counsel, Crown attorneys, advocates, and 
other specialists. A few are national, such as the Canadian Association of 
Law Teachers. One or two embrace a broad spectrum of lawyers, such as 
the "Osgoode Society" (for legal history). Other groups set ambitious 
goals, such as the Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 
which pursues its mandate on behalf of the provincial branch of the Bar 
Association, the Law Society, and the law faculties. 
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Special Constituencies within the Profession. There are a number of rela-
tively small organizations uniting lawyers on the basis of characteristics 
other than common professional interests. The Women's Law Association 
is an older organization; Women and Law is a younger grouping of 
feminists (lawyers and laypersons) concerned about both the role of 
women within the profession and the impact of law on women. The Thomas 
More Lawyers' Guild contains Catholic lawyers, and there are organi-
zations of Jewish lawyers and of members of other religious or ethnic 
groups, such as native peoples. The Law Union contains progressive 
lawyers and other legal workers (Martin, 1985). At the other end of the 
spectrum is the recently founded Ontario Lawyers' Association, which 
might be described as a right-wing grass-roots organization. 
Quasipublic Professional Bodies 
A number of bodies operate under the joint auspices of the legal profession 
and the government. Three examples illustrate their range of interests. The 
Canadian Law Information Council (CLIC) promotes computerized data 
retrieval, assesses the knowledge needed by the profession, and educates 
the public about law. The Canadian Institute for the Administration of 
Justice (CIA)) organizes conferences and stimulates research on the cost of 
justice and the organization of the judiciary. 
Since 19'70, legislation in almost all Canadian provinces has required 
that interest on lawyers' trust accounts (see table 9) be paid to a "law 
foundation" for public purposes (which obviously benefit the profession as 
well), such as law libraries, legal research and education, public legal edu-
cation, and legal aid. 
Compulsory Organizations 
Everyone practicing law must belong to the provincial law society. Ter-
mination or suspension of membership terminates or suspends the right to 
practice. Practicing law without membership is an offense. 
The governing body is controlled by an elected executive, whose mem-
bers generally are called "benchers." Older lawyers, those practicing in 
cities, members of large, prestigious firms, and leading civil and criminal 
advocates are overrepresented in these bodies, whereas rank-and-file prac-
titioners; women; and lawyers employed by government, universities, or 
corporations tend to be underrepresented (Orkin, 1971: 116- 124; see 
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are at large, the governing body is elected from defined geographic con-
stituencies and, therefore, may be relatively dose to the views of most 
practitioners; minority and dissident viewpoints seldom are represented. 
The clublike character of governing bodies is reflected in their relatively 
restrained behavior. There is some virtue in their passivity. For example, 
with one notable exception (Re Legal Profession Act, Re Martin [1949], 
D.L.R. 106 [B.C. Law Soc.], aff'd [1950], 3 D.L.R. 173 [B.C.C.A.]), the 
Canadian legal profession avoided attempts to enforce ideological con-
formity, even during the most intense period of the cold war. Indeed, 
leaders of the bar defended those accused during the notorious "spy trials" 
in the late 1940s. An air of "noblesse oblige" still often characterizes the 
official positions of law societies on public policy issues (Chadwick, 1981); 
however, members have little opportunity to influence the policies of the 
governing body. The annual meeting usually is proforma, and members 
can express their views on the decisions taken by their representatives 
only through elections. 
Governing bodies still do respond to pressure from voluntary organiza-
tions. For example, provincial law societies and provincial CBA branches 
compete or cooperate in the area of continuing legal education. Organiza-
tions of defense counsel may affect the rules of professional conduct. 
In addition, local law associations may shape decisions relating to the 
establishment of legal clinics. 
Because the provincial law societies exercise delegated statutory powers 
and collaborate with government in legal aid and law reform, leaders of the 
profession seek to avoid political controversy (Giffen, 1961; Orkin, 1971). 
While considerable attention recently was devoted to fending off an in-
quiry by the Province of Ontario into professional governance (Pro-
fessional Organizations Committee, 1980), the Law Society simultane-
ously responded to well-founded concerns about its disciplinary system. 
In general, the governing bodies of the Canadian legal profession have 
been fairly astute politically. They have perceived that there is more to be 
gained by cooperating with government than by opposing it. For example, 
the profession's governing body supported the establishment of a Legal 
Aid Plan in Ontario, despite some rank-and-file skepticism, with the result 
that the Law Society was given responsibility for administering the 
scheme. Similarly, the professionally-administered plan accommodated 
criticism of the fee-for-service aspects by funding community-based clinics. 
Law societies have hewed rather carefully to the line that their primary 
functions are to regulate admissions, standards of conduct, and (recently) 
competence (Thom, 197 4). Admissions committees in most Canadian 
provinces have been relatively lax in scrutinizing the nonacademic cre-
dentials of applicants, refusing to deny entry for minor drug convictions 
and other offenses connected with adolescent crises or student culture. In 
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one recent unusual case, a lawyer convicted of a criminal offense involving 
egregious sexual misconduct with minors was disbarred (ibid.); a similar 
fate befell a lawyer implicated in the theft of valuable securities (Novalc v. 
Law Society of British Columbia [1972], 31 D.L.R. [3d] 89 [B.C.S.C.]). It is 
relatively rare that anyone is disbarred except for dishonesty or other 
misconduct directly connected with professional functions, however. Of 
those disbarred in Ontario between 1945 and 1965, 83 percent improperly 
used client funds, 6 percent committed other fraud or forgery, and 8 
percent neglected client affairs (Arthurs, 1970). 
SYSTEMS OF PROFESSIONAL CONTROL: CODES OF ETHICS 
Provincial governing bodies have statutory power to discipline their mem-
bers for "conduct unbecoming a barrister or solicitor" or "unprofessional 
conduct" (e.g., Law Society Ad, Rev. Stat. Ont. 1980, c. 233, s. 34). In 
some jurisdictions, these vague standards are made more precise by ad-
ditional statutory language (e.g., Barristers and Solicitors Ad, Rev. Stat. 
British Columbia 1979, c. 26, s. 50) or, more frequently, by regulations 
(subordinate legislation) adopted subject to the approval of the provincial 
cabinet (and, in Quebec, of the Professional Council) (Professions Code, 
Rev. Stat. Quebec 1977, c. c-26, ss. 12, 13, 94, 95). Ontario, for example, 
regulates the handling of trust funds very extensively (Law Society Ad, 
Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 233, s. 63; Rev. Reg. Ont. 1980, Reg. 573). 
Most provinces have also adopted professional conduct rules (Law 
Society of Upper Canada, l 983c), which are treated as guidelines rather 
than binding codes by bodies responsible for discipline. These codes gen-
erally were inspired by those adopted by the CBA (1920; 1974). The 1920 
CBA Code was extremely vague (having been modeled on a contempo-
rary American Bar Association document) and did not respond to the 
changing nature of legal practice for the next half century. Never amended 
and seldom referred to in disciplinary proceedings or even hortatory 
discussions of professional ethics, it remained a well-kept secret. 
By contrast, the 197 4 code was well publicized, formally adopted in 
most provinces, and more influential in both disciplinary proceedings and 
discussions of appropriate standards of professional conduct. Yet it, too, 
is overly vague and insufficiently rooted in reality. The code appears to 
adopt the perspective of the client and the public. For example, restrictions 
on advertising-for clearly anticompetitive purposes-are contained in a 
rule entitled "Making Legal Services Available" and couched in terms of 
the desire to avoid either burdening the public with the cost of advertising 
or misleading the public. 
Disciplinary enforcement is preoccupied with ensuring the honesty of 
1 
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lawyers (Arthurs, 1970). Regulations prescribe methods of accounting for 
client funds; all law societies conduct regular audits, and some engage in 
"spot audits"- there were 864 in Ontario in 1984. Noncompliance with 
these rules, even when one is negligent rather than dishonest, generally 
leads to discipline. Dishonesty is almost certain to result in disbarment, 
except when there are unusual mitigating circumstances, such as mental 
problems or personal tragedies. Victims of lawyer dishonesty receive pay-
ments (generally within high but fixed limits) from a compensation fund 
to which all lawyers must contribute. Payments in Ontario rose from 
Can$737,000 for 88 claims in 1981 to Can$1,182,000 for 216 claims in 
1984 (Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Reports). 
Lawyers almost never are disciplined except when the public is injured 
by fraud, perjutry, or some other criminal ad (Arthurs, 1970; see also table 
12, this chapter). Between 1966 and 1979 the number of complaints rose in 
Ontario, but the number of disbarments remained constant at approxi-
mately four a year; since then it has risen to twelve in 1980, nineteen in 
1981, twenty-five in 1982, and twenty-one in 1984 (Law Society of Upper 
Canada, Annual Reports). Otherwise, the disciplinary process is used to 
enforce professional interests only in a few high-profile cases when the 
authority of the Law Society is challenged. For example, a recent well-
publicized and extensive advertising campaign by a lawyer evoked the 
threat of disciplinary sanctions and stimulated extensive litigation before 
leading to relaxation of the rules (Jabour v. Law Society of British Columbia 
(1982], 137 D.L.R. [3d] 1 [Sup. Ct. Can.]). 
Informal enforcement processes may influence professional behavior, 
however; these processes include investigations by the law society and 
threats to investigate, informal admonitions or formal warnings by the 
governing body, and social and economic sanctions by formal and in-
formal local lawyer groups. Such informal processes generally are directed 
toward either matters of intraprofessional concern or minor infractions 
relating to public behavior or service to clients. 
Self-regulation is least satisfactory in ensuring competence (Hurlburt, 
1979). While there is a great deal of exhortation and a certain amount of 
education, there has been very little enforcement of quality standards by 
means of systematic or random testing. Indeed, until the adoption of the 
new CBA Code of Professional Conduct (rule 2) in 197 4, incompetence 
was not explicitly declared to be unacceptable. As a consequence, the few 
lawyers who have been disbarred for incompetence are those who have 
suffered a virtually total collapse of personality and become unable to 
carry on their practice; in such cases, removal from practice is viewed as 
nondisciplinary. 
Recently, however, the provincial bars have sought to reassure the 
public by requiring lawyers to carry "errors and omissions" insurance. 
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Within a few years after its introduction, claims- and hence premiums-
began to mount (see table 13), especially in real estate practices (see table 
14). This engendered considerable concern and led to the development of 
three. strategies designed to enhance competence, .thereby reducing both 
claims and premiums (Swan, 1982; Hurlburt, 1979): (1) programs of con-
tinuing legal education and "claims control" have been instituted (Gold, 
1972: 23), (2) rehabilitative programs assist lawyers whose practices appear 
to be falling below an acceptable standard (Marshall, 1980), and (3) proper 
standards of practice are encouraged by experience rating of insurance 
premiums (in Ontario, rates varied between Can$825 and Can$3,300 in 
1983/84). 
Victims of incompetence also may sue lawyers for damages (Belobaba, 
1978; Pritchard, 1978), and judgments appear to be increasing in number 
and size. Finally, a judge may intervene when an advocate performs incom-
petently, although this remains exceptional (Re Solicitor [1971], 1 Ont. Rep. 
138). 
Specialization has been increasing, at least in larger urban centers (Ar-
thurs et al., 1971; Esau, 1979; Colvin et al., 1978; Colvin, 1979). Neverthe-
less, clients still encounter difficulty finding lawyers who can provide 
competent service even in such prosaic household "specialties" as criminal 
law, family law, or civil litigation (Trebilcock & Reiter, 1982). Proposals to 
certify specialists, thereby ensuring their competence and enhancing their 
visibility to clients, were adopted in principle by the CBA in 1983; how-
ever, the law societies remain adamantly opposed to both formal certifi-
cation and systems of self-designation. Instead, the profession has attacked 
those who "advertise" their specialty and thereby seek competitive advan-
tage (Professional Organizations Committee, 1980). 
SYSTEMS OF PROFESSIONAL CONTROL: PROCEDURES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
If a complaint against a lawyer progresses beyond the stage of informal 
discussion, the disciplinary committee conducts a formal hearing, pros-
ecuted by the Law Society staff or special counsel. The committee's deci-
sion often is subject to approval by, or appeal to, the full governing body 
(e.g., Law Society Act, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 233, ss. 33, 34, 39). The 
committee can reprimand, limit the right to practice, suspend, or disbar. 
Some law societies also have the power to impose financial penalties (e.g., 
Barristers and Solicitors Act, Rev. Stat. British Columbia 1979, c. 26, 
s. 51(1]) and to suspend those suffering from physical or mental illness, 
while managing their practices to protect client assets and interests. The 
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legal or procedural errors; however, judges are reluctant to retry facts or 
review penalties absent egregious injustice (Prescott v. Law Society of British 
Columbia [1971], 19 D.L.R. [3d] 446 fB.C.C.A]). 
The profession thus controls both the prosecution and adjudication of 
misconduct. There is no provision for a "lay observer" or any other lay 
participation in the disciplinary process, except for the involvement of lay 
benchers, if any. Moreover, since most dishonest lawyers are bankrupt, 
clients can only seek ex gratia payments from the profession's compen1 
sation fund. 
EDUCATION, SOCIALIZATION, AND ALLOCATION 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
For most of the nineteenth century, and through the first half of the 
twentieth in some provinces (including Ontario, the largest common law 
jurisdiction), appre_µticeship was the primary means by which Canadian 
lawyers were educated. Full-time law schools began to appear about 1880, 
but both the University of Montreal (1878) and Dalhousie University law 
faculties (1883) had minuscule professorial complements until after 1945, 
depending largely on part-time lecturers from the bench and the bar. A 
similar situation prevailed at the Universities of Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
Elsewhere, provincial law societies opened their own law schools-alone 
or in collaboration with universities-again primarily using practitioners 
as teachers (Bucknall et al., 1968; Baker, 1983; see also table 15, this 
chapter). When A. Z. Reed completed his classic study of legal education 
in Canada and the United States in 1928, therefore, it was clear that the 
Canadian legal profession enjoyed even more control over the production 
of lawyers than did its U.S. counterpart (Reed, 1928: 530). 
By 1925, seven out of nine provinces required at least two years of 
college before entry to law school, and the others required some post-
secondary study. All provinces required at least three years of legal 
studies, and four required attendance at local law schools. All required a 
period of office work and a final examination (Reed, 1925: 3; see also table 
16, this chapter). 
Although some law schools (including the largest common law school, 
Osgoode Hall in Ontario) were operated by the legal profession itself, 
some by a university, and some jointly by a university and the local bar, 
these alternatives were neither conflictual nor competitive; they merely 
coexisted, each reigning supreme in a particular province. Moreover, all 
schools had agreed on a common curriculum proposed by the CBA in the 
early 1920s (Reed, 1928: 203). Finally, the development of academic educa-
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tion was inhibited by the sheer lack of full-time instructors: there were no 
more than sixteen full-time law teachers in all of Canada in 1928 (Reed, 
1928: 373; Bucknall et al., 1968; Baker, 1983). It is no wonder, then, that 
the same assumptions that led Reed to propose. a dual system of legal 
education in the United States persuaded him to recommend a uniform 
system of legal education in Canada. 
The bar's monopoly over aU phases of the production of lawyers lasted 
until the 1950s, when the university law faculties gradually claimed in-
creasing authority over legal education. In 1957, under pressure from the 
academic community, Canada's l(\rgest legal professional body, the Law 
Society of Upper Canada (Ontario), negotiated a new arrangement with 
the universities giving the professoriat ultimate responsibility for the LL.B. 
curriculum (Amup, 1982; Bucknall et al., 1968). In 1968 the Law Society 
transferred its own law school to York University (Arthurs, 1967). Similar 
developments in other provinces during the 1950s and 1960s, coupled 
with the rapid proliferation and expansion of law faculties, assured the 
universities their present dominance of legal education, but they seemed 
unprepared to assume the responsibility. As late as 1950, there were only 
about 40 full-time law teachers in all of Canada; fewer than 100 were 
added in the next decade. By 1970, however, numbers had tripled to about 
450, and by 1980 they stood at 650. Between 1960 and 1980 there was 
considerable innovation in curriculum, teaching methods, and modes of 
research, sometimes engendering expressions of professional concern 
(MacDonald, 1979; Veitch, 1979; Maclaren, 197 4). At no time, however, 
did law schools challenge the profession's ideology or intellectual capital 
(McKennirey, 1983: 118; Consultative Group on Education and Research 
in Law, 1983). In addition, the provincial law societies continued to control 
the professional training phase, which generally includes a period of ap-
prenticeship and formal instruction in various adjectival and practical mat-
ters, as well as skills training. 
LEGAL EDUCATION AS A STRATEGY OF SOCIALJZATION AND 
ALLOCATION 
There is no scholarly tradition in Canadian law to challenge professional 
priorities. The strategy of the law schools has been to stand at a distance 
from the profession, sometimes through a scholastic concern with doctrinal 
analysis and sometimes through a robust critique of professional knowl-
edge and ideology. At the same time, academics seek to be perceived as 
highly "professional" without being involved in, or even considering, all 
the activities of practicing lawyers. Legal education projects an artificial and 
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Law schools try to socialize students to an academic model of legal 
practice and social reality. Although the attempt largely fails, the pro-
fession lavishes considerable energy on resocializing students to pro-
fessional attitudes and values through articling and the bar admission 
courses and also through indoctrination of new graduates. Moreover, the 
bar has a valuable ally: the majority of law students, who tend to identify 
with what they imagine to be the professional project. 
There are few exceptions to these generalizations. The University of 
Quebec at Montreal deliberately embarked on an alternative vision of 
legal education, emphasizing its social dimension and expressing overt 
antagonism toward professional elitism (Mackay, i 979). Recently founded 
law schools in Calgary and Victoria made important pedagogic innova-
tions. McGill, Ottawa, and Moncton all have responded to the bilingual 
and bisystemic nature of Canadian law. Several schools are committed to 
clinical legal education. Interdisciplinary studies, even joint degrees in law 
and some other field (typically business), have become available in most 
law schools. Students seize these varied opportunities relatively rarely, 
however, and the innovations affect the margins rather than the "pro-
fessional" mainstream of LLB. studies. 
Professional control of entry to practice, coupled with professional 
administration of articling and bar admission courses, discouraged the 
emergence of private, entrepreneurial "cram" schools. Nothing ensured 
that the profession's own educational programs would maintain high stan-
dards (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1972). For example, articling is 
regarded as essentially a matter between student and principal. Law 
societies do exhort both to pursue the objectives of articling, but there is 
virtually no quality control. Teaching is a sideline for the articling prin-
cipal, who is primarily (and sometimes totally) preoccupied with the ser-
vice of clients. Students are likely either to be passive observers or to 
perform delegated tasks-at best of legal research and drafting, at worst 
of mere logistical support. The functions of an articling student seldom 
relate directly to the practical business of interviewing, advocacy, or 
negotiation. This may explain why articling is regarded as paid employ-
ment (although salaries are well below market rates for newly admitted 
lawyers). 
Articling has acquired a secondary importance as an entree to future 
jobs, however. Large law firms use articling as a screening device to 
identify junior lawyers who may be hired on their call to the bar. Small law 
firms rrtay use articling stud~nts to cope with their work loads, selecting 
occasional recruits when additional business warrants expansion. This is 
not automatic: a I 980 study revealed that 66 percent of students did not 
return to work at the firm where they articled, and more than 40 percent 




that follows the articling year in Ontario (Huxter, 1981: 18}. Nevertheless, 
students compete energetically for articling jobs (ibid.). The prestige, in-
come, and work quality offered by large law firms makes them the first 
choice of many (see table 17). While these firms historically tended to 
recruit primarily on the basis of the "old school tie," now they emphasize 
academic credentials. This reflects the need for able students and juniors to 
handle sophisticated legal work, the diminishing acceptability of discrimi-
nation, and the growing economic power of various minority 'groups who 
are more likely to take their legal business to law firms that hire their best 
young members. 
Large firms have little tolerance for idiosyncratic personal behavior, 
political views, or lifestyles. As a result, a few "ethnic" law firms have 
emerged, which sometimes deliberately dilute their parochial character by 
adding members of other groups. More recently, too, some "political" left-
wing lawyers have formed firms or adopted space-sharing arrangements. 
Lawyers tend to remain in the practice seWng that they enter during 
articles or on their first jobs, although large law firms weed out some 
recruits after a probationary period, some small firms amalgamate with 
each other or with large firms, and a few individual practitioners change 
their practices becaus~ of either unusual success or failure (Adam & Lahey, 
1981; Huxter, 1981; Berger, 1979; Colvin et al., 1978: 101). 
DIVISION AND STRATIFICATION WITHIN THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 
THE MYTH OF A SINGLE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The Canadian legal profession clings strongly to the notion that all its 
members engage in a common activity, share common attitudes, pursue 
common interests, and participate equally in the common enterprise of 
delivering legal services to the public. There is merely a single professional 
credential earned in a single fashion in each jurisdiction (except Quebec, 
with its Chambre des Notaires), a. single provincial professional organization, 
no formal recognition of specialties or distinctive ethical codes for those 
who pursue them, and only loose, voluntary organizations of lawyers 
distinguished by special roles or interests. 
The myth is patently at odds with the fads, however. Within the 
profession, there is a clear division of .labor, clientele, and rewards (see 
table 18). Moreover, both the profession and the public accord differentfal 
respect and recognition to individuals and practice roles. 
Why, then, does the profession insist so vigorously on its unity and 
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dearth of "hard" facts about Canadian lawyers and very little self-scrutiny 
by the profession, (2) the myth of professional unity helps to reinforce 
existing hierarchies by making them less visible, and (3) a unified pro-
fession can better protect its autonomy and influence public and govern-
mental opinion than one that speaks with many voices. 
"ELITE" LAW FIRMS 
Elite law firms in Canada tend to resemble those in the United States (albeit 
on a somewhat reduced scale and with some distinctive Canadian touches) 
as a result of commonalities in their work, clientele, recruitment, and 
organization. Indeed, they share some multinational clients, are involved in 
transactions stretching across national boundaries, belong to international 
legal organizations, derive their legal knowledge from common sources, 
and occasionally are linked by international partnerships or networks of 
law firms. 
Elite firms contain between 25 and 200 lawyers. In 1971, 10 percent of 
all firms earned almost half of all fees, while half of all firms earned only 14 
percent (Statistics Canada, 1971). In 1985, 10 firms had more than 100 
lawyers, and another 15 had between 50 and 100 (Canadian Law List, 
1985). Although most operate from a single office found in the business or 
financial district of a large city (see table 19), a few now have branches 
abroad, while others are expanding on a multicity or interprovincial basis, 
despite local protectionism (Black v. Law Society of Alta. [1985], 5 West 
Wkly Rep. 284). 
Elite law firms tend to be organized hierarchically. They employ a 
number of articling students, from whom they often choose associates. 
At the end of a probationary period associates either become partners or 
leave (see table 20). Admission to partnership occasionally occurs as a re-
sult of merger with, or absorption of, another law firm or through lateral 
movement. 
Elite firms also depend heavily on office manage::-s, accountants, and 
librarians, as well as large numbers of law clerks. Indeed, the number of 
specialists and law clerks sometimes equals or exceeds the number of 
professionally qualified lawyers (Taman, 1978; Colvin et al., 1978), and, of 
course, every elite law firm will employ large numbers of highly skilled 
secretaries and clerical personnel and invest heavily in office equipment 
(CBA, 1985). A managing partner or management committee is respon-
sible for making and administering personnel policy, overseeing the fi-
nancial affairs of the firm, and defining its relationship to its clients and the 
community at large. 
Elite firms generally have significant corporate, tax, litigation, and con-
I 
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veyancing departments and sometimes specialize in industrial property, 
labor, transportation, and communications or estate planning as well (Col-
vin et al., 1978: 145). Certain lawyers may be identified as having a special 
aptitude for legal research and tend to perform it for other members of the 
firm. Senior partners may become preoccupied with the affairs of major 
clients, whom they cultivate and advise on business strategies, govern-
mental and community relations, and other matters that may not involve 
the application of legal knowledge (Clement, 1975a; Gall, 1977; Porter, 
1965; Newman, 1975). While many of these senior partners remain inter-
ested in "lawyers' law'' and counsel their junior colleagues, some have 
"graduated" from the practice of law. Often it is partners in their forties 
and fifties who perform the most sophisticated legal work, but some may 
be drawn increasingly into the affairs of their corporate clients ~nd occa-
sionally leave the firm permanently or temporarily to serve as senior 
executives of major business organizations (Batten, 1980). 
The financial lifeblood of the firm is the performance of legal services 
for its ongoing clients-major business, financial, or governmental in-
stitutions (Batten, 1980; Clement, 1975a; Gall, 1977; Colvin, 1979). The 
relationship of the elite firm to its clientele is further cemented by recruit-
ing important individuals who have left politics or the public service and 
seconding firm members to various governmental bodies. Specialist de-
partments also attract clients, often referred by other lawyers. Fearing to 
lose future referrals, firms take pains to ensure that the client is returned to 
the referring lawyer upon completion of the task at harid. Elite firms also 
may maintain a modest "household" practice, reflecting commitments that 
antedate the firm's rise to eminence, catering to the legal needs of indi-
viduals employed by their corporate clients, and responding to partners' 
. beliefs about their professional and community responsibilities. 
Because their clients are mainly wealthy institutions, elite law firms are 
able to charge very high fees and to compensate associates- and especial-
ly partners- accordingly (see table 21; Altman & Weil, Inc., 1980). Close 
association with a corporate clientele also affords these lawyers unusual 
opportunities to develop their own investments and business activities 
(subject to professional conduct and "insider trading" rules) (Adam & 
Lahey, 1981; Smith & Tepperman, 1974). Elite firm lawyers also enjoy the 
opportunity to become involved in extremely sophisticated legal work 
that demands, and generally elicits, a very high level of competence 
(Batten, 1980). Also, because elite firms are large and hierarchically struc-
tured, they can allow members to become active in professional bodies, 
community organizations, part-time law teaching, postgraduate study, or 
political activity. 
The very conditions that generate these rewards also exact a consider-
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might alienate clients. This produces an extreme commitment to meeting 
deadlines, covering all eventualities, and avoiding technical errors. The 
pace and intensity of professional work may well constrain the personal 
lives of the lawyers. Moreover, because of the close relationship that often 
develops between elite firm lawyers and their corporate clients, the 
former-if not self-selected prior to joining the firm- subsequently may 
be socialized in matters ranging from personal dress and deportment to 
political perspectives. 
METRO POLIT AN MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS 
Medium-sized firms of ten to thirty lawyers often share many character-
istics with the elite firms. Indeed, they often are either the remaining elite 
firms of an earlier period, which have opted against significant growth, or 
incipient elite firms, perhaps based on the merger of several small partner-
ships. Some, however, are organized around a small number of specialties 
and do not purport to offer a complete line of legal services. The latter may 
provide incomes that, while very generous, are considerably lower than 
the extravagant professional and business incomes available in the elite 
firms. 
Medium-sized metropolitan firms often aggressively pursue both new 
recruits and clients. Some have hired very able women and members of 
minority groups, whereas others, for essentially the same reason, appar-
ently have opted for impeccable social credentials in their recruitment. 
SOLO PRACTITIONERS AND SMALL FIRMS IN METROPOLITAN 
AREAS 
The general practitioner is a central figure in the mythology. of the legal 
profession. Solo practice and small partnerships were the most common 
form of legal practice until after World War IL The trend toward larger 
firms was evident by the 1950s (Nelligan, 1950, 1951), however, and it 
accelerated thereafter. Solo practitioners declined from 43 percent of all 
Ontario lawyers in 1950 to 21 percent in 1966 (Arthurs et al., 1971: 
522- 523). By the 1970s, far fewer lawyers were practicing on their own or 
in partnerships of two to five lawyers; however, the tendency toward 
consolidation was halted, and possibly reversed, by recent economic con-
ditions and the rapid growth of the profession. Established firms are ex-
panding at a slower rate, and small and medium-sized firms are wary of 
adding to their overheads by hiring new lawyers. For the first time in 
many years, a significant number of able yoWlg graduates find themselves 
in solo practice by default rather than by choice (Huxter, 1981: 177). 
I . 
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Solo and small firm practitioners fall into three quite different groups. 
First, there are the specialists (Arthurs et al., 1971: 507 ff.; Colvin et al., 
1978: 158), including some of the most highly regarded practitioners of 
criminal and family law. Operating largely for noncorporate clients, these 
specialists do not require the elaborate staffs and facilities characteristic of 
the elite firms. Criminal defense counsel, especially, tend to reject the 
paraphernalia of modern practice (Schumiatcher, 1979). Although an ex-
tensive (if imperfect) legal aid system exists, it is not unusual for leading 
defense counsel to refuse to accept legally-aided clients, preferring to act 
without charge in order to underline the traditional independence of the 
bar and its service ethic. A few lawyers (many of them solo or small firm 
practitioners) are heavily dependent on legal aid, however (see table 22). 
A second category of smaH firm practitioners are lawyer-entrepreneurs. 
A number of lawyers devote their energies to land assembly and mortgage 
financing, especially during several protracted periods of real estate specula-
tion. Despite their considerable economic success, entrepreneurial lawyers 
seldom enjoy high repute within the profession. A disproportionately high 
number of disbarments occurred within their ranks, perhaps because they 
too readily accepted marketplace assumptions about relationships with 
investors and partners, rather than the m~h more circumscribed fiduciary 
role prescribed by codes of professional ethics (Arthurs, 1970). 
In the shadow of economic difficulties, a number of young lawyers have 
begun to try unconventional ways of providing legal services through 
"law shops," charging lower fees in standardized matters, in franchised 
offices in store fronts, department stores, or other unconventional settings. 
Established lawyers have responded with hostility, invoking restrictions 
on advertising in order to inhibit expansion (Re Klein and Law Society of 
Upper Canada; Re Dvorak and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985], 16 
D.L.R. [4th] 489). Young lawyers also have become involved in producing 
law reports, manuals, and practitioner-oriented texts and providing re-
search services for law firms. 
By far the greatest concentration of solo practitioners and small partner-
ships is in the "household sector": house transfers, uncontested divorces, 
debt collection, other minor civil litigation, and dealings with various 
levels of government (Arthurs et al., 1971: 522 ff.; Yale, 1982: 38). Because 
house transfers probably generate the most income, lawyers serving the 
household sector are particularly vulnerable to economic fluctuations, es-
pecially in the residential real estate market. Since the profit on any indi-
vidual transaction is small, only volume can produce high earnings. Lay 
assistants, especially stenographers and title searchers, can handle most of 
this work, leaving the lawyer free to supervise employees and deal with 
clients (Colvin et al., 1978). 
Because most individuals require legal services only occasionally, the 
solo practitioner or small partnership constantly must attract clients. This 
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is especially difficult in large cities, where social contact is attenuated and 
competition for legal business is relatively fierce because of the impossi-
bility of creating and enforcing informal understandings about price main-
tenance and other restrictive practices. Disproportionate numbers of Jews 
and Catholics and members of other minority groups are located in this 
sector of practice (Arthurs et al., 1971: 523). Because the household sector 
offers only limited opportunity for sophisticated legal work, and because 
of their own personal characteristics, these practitioners enjoy limited job 
mobility. They will seldom be able to offer prospective employers highly 
developed skills and reputations. 
Ideological commitments formed or reinforced during service in a law 
school or other community clinic setting lead some young graduates to 
choose practice in the household sector or in criminal or family law. Others 
enter loose associations or partnerships that focus on such issues as 
women's rights, employment law, immigration, and prisoners' rights. 
LA WYERS IN SMALLER CENTERS 
Practice in smaller centers seems to be concentrated within a narrower 
spectrum of settings. For several reasons, the largest firms are much smaller, 
and solo practice is potentially more rewarding and prestigious than it 
might be in Toronto, Montreal, or Vancouver. On one hand, large industrial 
or commercial concerns with plants or offices in small communities tend to 
rely for their important legal needs on the elite metropolitan firms, whose 
contacts are with their bankers, directors, and head office managers rather 
than with local operational personnel. On the other hand, when household 
clients in small centers encounter atypical or complex legal problems, such 
as a patent, a murder charge, or a regulatory issue, they may seek the aid of 
an outside expert. · 
Offsetting the more limited opportunities for professional advancement 
is the much greater scope for community recognition and collegial sup-
port. Lawyers frequently join local elites, finding their way into politics, 
civic works, and charities. Moreover, lawyers in small communities make 
formal and informal arrangements concerning fees, assist each other with 
personal problems in the event of disability (or even professional mis-
conduct), and share knowledge and techniques. 
LAWYERS EMPLOYED IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND 
EDUCATION 
Lawyers working as legal professionals in settings other than private 
practice share certain common characteristics: (1) their identification with 
CANADA 157 
their employer's organizational aims and style produces a distinctive sub-
culture setting them apart from private practitioners; (2) they are special-
ists with a highly developed sense of the particular political, social, and 
economic context of law; and (3) because their earnings are not related 
to the number of transactions processed or "billable hours" worked, em-
ployed lawyers are spared both the insecurity of solo practice and the in-
tense pressure within elite firms. In a society characterized by increasing 
bureaucratization, institutional growth, legal complexity, and a more re-
fined division of labor, therefore, the number of employed lawyers has 
increased over the past two decades, their status has improved, and their 
rewards have been enhanced. 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
Because legal aid offices, community clinics, and advocacy organizations 
are chronically short of funds, lawyers in these roles often are poorly paid 
and carry heavy caseloads. Since these lawyers develop special skills and 
insights into particular areas of law and campaign to reform them, how-
ever, their contribution and influence are out of all proportion to their 
numbers and rewards. Their close and ongoing identification with a single 
"client" and cause tends to differentiate them from other lawyers in terms 
of ideology, lifestyle, and perception of the legal system. · 
STRATIFICATION: PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RANKING 
Lawyers derive their prestige from at least three sources: professional 
skills, public activities, and association with other prestigious persons and 
institutions. It is not uncommon for a lawyer to be highly regarded by 
colleagues as a careful conveyancer, tax planner, or procedural specialist 
yet be virtually unknown to the general public. Conversely, lawyers who 
are extremely active in business, community affairs, politics, or journalism 
may be extremely well known to the public yet lack standing within the 
profession. This often is the fate of lawyers employed in business, govern-
ment, and the universities. Public and private reputations tend to coalesce 
for lawyers in elite fi rms, which are involved in major transactions or 
litigation and deliver specialized legal services of high quality. 
These rankings may be reflected in the bestowal of government honors 
- appointments to the bench and to boards and commissions of enquiry 
and ad hoc special assignments. In some provinces, moreover, political 
patronage · may strongly influence the appointment of Queen's Counsel 
------,.-. =· _;--::-_--,_,..,,._ =--- -- ~ ~ ~ ·-
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and somewhat influence the appointment of lower court judges (Fowler, 
1978; Robins, 1974; Angus, 1967; Ratushny, 1976). Rankings also are 
evidenced by election to governing bodies of law societies and voluntary 
organizations (Trebilcock et al., 1979). Here, too, political influences tend 
to dominate peer judgments about reputation. 
THE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF PRACTICE 
There is a fairly direct correlation between the location, size, and attrac-
tiveness of law offices and their infrastructure (office machinery, libraries, 
and support staff) and the affluence of their clientele. Even solo lawyers 
have sought to lower costs by adopting labor-saving devices, employing 
paraprofessional staff (Altman & Weil, Inc., 1980: 13 ), locating offices in 
older buildings or outside the central city or sharing premises with common 
library facilities, reception, and telephone service. 
However, cost-cutting has its limits. Law society regulations require the 
submission of annually audited accounts. All practitioners must pay an an-
nual fee to the provincial professional body, contribute to a compensation 
fund, and pay premiums for /1 errors and omissions" insurance-a total of 
about Can$1,500 per annum in Ontario in 1984. Lawyers may bill what-
ever they wish, subject to subsequent arbitration by a court official (an 
"assessment officer" in Ontario) and the theoretical (but actually negli-
gible) risk of professional sanctions for overcharging (Reiter, 1978: 66). 
Lawyers and clients, especially large institutional clients, also may reach 
general understandings or explicit contractual arrangements concerning 
fees. Litigants in most Canadian provinces may arrange to pay a fee 
contingent on the outcome of the lawsuit (Arlidge, 197 4; Halpern & 
Turnbull, 1982), although some lawyers refuse to accept them. Moreover, 
even in jurisdictions that do not formally permit contingent fees, law-
yers often (and properly) take into account the "results achieved" in set-
ting their fees, charging less to impecunious and unsuccessful litigants 
(Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook, rule 10, 
SS. 1 (e), 2). 
Statutory tariffs cover some matters, such as the probate of wills, while 
court schedules of "party-and-party" costs regulate how much a losing 
litigant must pay for the winner's legal fees (Orkin 1968). These official 
indices influence what lawyers charge their own clients, adjusted for the 
importance of the matter, the results achieved, and the time expended 
(Re A -Solicitor (1972], 3 Ont. Rep. 433). Many local lawyers groups also 
have adopted minimum or suggested fee tariffs for standard nonlitigious 
services. 
Governments intervene to affect the price of legal services as well. They 
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have enacted legislation defining the scope of the professional monopo-
ly, thereby restricting competition by lay persons or other occupational 
groups (such as accountants) and increasing lawyer income (Trebilcock & 
Reiter, 1982: 84 ff.); however, government affects professional incomes 
most strongly through legal aid schemes. Although legal aid fee structures 
do not govern private legal services, they may set a standard that pay-
ing clients will use. Legal clinics, legal aid staff lawyers, and publicly re-
imbursed private practitioners may undercut existing market prices. 
This undercutting may reflect government-imposed budget limitations 
as well as economies of scale. In some provinces many lawyers earn a 
significant portion of their incomes from legal aid. When the government 
cuts the budget, lawyers who depend on legal aid funds may find them-
selves pressed to the wall. Professional criticism of cutbacks in legal aid 
thus expresses both a concern for access to justice and a desire to preserve 
professional incomes (Bowlby, 1983: 145-147). 
These factors differently affect the various professional strata. Elite law 
firms and certain specialists generally disregard suggested fee tariffs. Solo 
lawyers who practice family or criminal law may be highly sensitive to the 
level of legal aid expenditures but largely indifferent to attempts to es-
tablish minimum conveyancing charges. Those specializing in real estate 
may cooperate in price-fixing, especially if they work in small communities. 
THE REGULATION OF NONPRICE COMPETITION 
The rules of professional conduct regulate nonprice competition primarily 
through limitations on the form and content of advertising (Hudec & 
Trebilcock, 1982; Evans & Wolfson, 1982). While the controls generally 
are more restrictive than those in the United States, there nevertheless are 
important differences among the provinces. Manitoba, the most liberal 
jurisdiction, permits lawyers to advertise price and nonprice information in 
any medium as long as they do not mislead the public, avoid "puffery," 
accurately describe the services offered, and adhere to the fees quoted 
(Mitchell, 1982: 129). Ontario not only forbids all advertising of fees 
(except for the cost of an initial consultation) but also limits nonfee adver-
tising to publication of the lawyer's professional card in newspapers and 
other printed matter (Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct 
Handbook, rules 13, 14). Howe-ver, the same law society also introduced a 
lawyer referral system that informs clients of practitioner specialties and 
entitles clients to an initial consultation at relatively low cost; and it 
established a "Law Line" telephone service providing basic information on 
typical legal problems and directing callers to the referral service (Bowlby, 
1982: 158 ff.). 
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In Ontario, the Professional Organizations Committee (1980: 192) noted 
that individuals and small businesses in large urban settings are most likely 
to lack information about legaJ services because they are less frequent 
consumers than large corporate clients and because informal referral net-
works are less effective in large metropolitan areas. The CBA and many 
provincial bodies have adopted a rule whose commentary notes that 
"when considering whether or not limited advertising in a particular area 
meets the public need, consideration must be given to the clientele to be 
served" (Code of Professional Conduct, c. xiii, s. 6). 
There is some evidence that urban solo practiti9ners and those in firms 
with less than four lawyers most strongly support the liberalization of 
advertising rules (Sharpe, 1981: 279). Their colleagues in rural areas and 
small cities oppose any easing of these restrictions by an even greater 
margin, however. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that neither 
federal combines (antitrust) legislation nor quasiconstitutional guarantees 
of freedom of expression prohibit such restrictions (Jabour v. Law Society of 
British Columbia [1982], 137 D.L.R. [3d] 1 [Sup. Ct. Can.]). 
Codes of conduct also prohibit lawyers from "touting" by approaching 
potential clients directly, claiming "specialist" status, attracting publicity in 
the media, or encouraging real estate agents, clubs, or other intermediaries 
to "steer" business to them (Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional 
Conduct Handbook, rule 13, ss. 7-8). Lawyers may not practice in multi-
professional firms, which could make internal referrals (Quinn, 1978); in 
some provinces, they may not practice another profession or occupation 
that could attract legal clients. 
These measures limit the profession's urban "proletariat"- solo and 
small firm practitioners-at the behest of its intermediate orders, practi-
tioners in smaller centers. Although metropolitan solo practitioners do not 
"poach" the clients of country lawyers, the latter seem to fear that greater 
competition in their own locales will disturb existing patterns of practice. 
Anticompetitive rules also provide a legitimate device for harrassing non-
conformists in country towns and small cities. In larger centers, where 
enforcement is more difficult, some competition persists within the house-
hold sector despite the rules. 
Elite firms and specialists attract business by joining clubs, serving as 
corporate directors, becoming involved in politics, providing communi-
ty service, teaching part-time, and writing books. They seek to suppress 
competition in order to strengthen the profession's image as a superior 
social class rather than a "mere" trade or business. Since such restraints also 
invite public disapproval without conferring economic benefits, however, 
elite lawyers and leading specialists have no interest in actually enforcing 
anticompetitive rules. 
CANADA 
EFFECT ON THE PROFESSION OF RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL SERVICES DELIVERY 
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Legal aid programs not only have encouraged more lawyers to practice 
criminal and family law; they also have created jobs for salaried profes-
sionals in community-based clinics in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Saskatch-
ewan and in government legal aid bureaus in Quebec. Indeed, legal aid 
may have a greater impact on lawyers and their professional careers than 
on low-income Canadians. Ontario established the first provincially funded 
judicare scheme in 1967. The number of accused represented increased 
from 1,587 persons in 1963 (Friedland, 1964) to nearly 41,000 in 1983, at a 
cost of Can$21 million, or Can$523.86 per case (Law Society of Upper 
Canada, 1983a: 49). National expenditures on legal aid rose from Can$62 
million in 1975/76 to Can$90 million in 1978/79, and per capita expendi-
tures from Can$2.71 to Can$3.81, although the latter figures vary greatly 
among provinces. Between 1978/79 and 1984/85, the total expenditures 
increased from Can$31 to Can$60 million in Quebec and from Can$34 to 
Can$70 million in Ontario. 
Because the provinces are responsible for administering justice, their 
legal _aid programs differ significantly (Zemans, 1979; 1983: 373-435). 
Federal cost-sharing agreements require the provinces to administer a 
flexible means test that considers income, disposable assets, indebtedness, 
maintenance obligations, and other expenses (National Legal Aid Research 
Centre, 1981: 2; Statistics Canada, 1981: 20). In addition to providing legal 
services for representation in court, many Canadian legal aid schemes have 
adopted the Scottish duty counsel system, which provides a salaried law-
yer to anyone making a first court appearance after having been taken 
into custody. In some remote areas of the country, including the Yukon 
and the Northwest Territories, duty counsel travel with the court. Most 
are private lawyers paid a per diem, but Ontario recently hired full-time 
duty counsel on two-year contracts to appear on bail applications and 
guilty pleas in the criminal courts of metropolitan Toronto. Part-time duty 
counsel also serve in the family courts. 
In order to ensure that legal aid remains independent of government, 
seven provinces have created autonomous corporations. In both Ontario 
and New Brunswick, a committee of the provincial law society administers 
the program. Within judicare jurisdictions, most regions have Area Com-
mittees composed primarily of volunteers, most of whom are lawyers, who 
set policy and deal with appeals from refusals of service. 
New Brunswick and Alberta reimburse private practitioners for provid-
ing legal aid. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island deliver almost all legal 
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vices through private lawyers, community clinics and the duty counsel 
program do employ salaried lawyers. Most other provinces deliver legal 
services through a mixed system, which has become known as "the Ca-
nadian compromise" between the English judicare and American salaried 
models. In response to the inception of community clinics, the Ontario 
profession commissioned its own "independent" study in 1972, which 
reviewed the arguments for and against salaried legal services and, not 
surprisingly, concluded: 
Except for limited special purposes which may suggest the full engagement of 
a solicitor for Legal Aid purposes, we remain of the view that the public is 
better served by a profession forced to compete for public patronage (rich or 
poor) in circumstances most likely to offer the public a meaningful choice and 
where the lawyer is only paid for the work done. (Law Society of Upper 
Canada, 1972: 42) 
Nevertheless, the profession gradually accepted community clinics, 
partly because two judicial inquiries strongly supported them and en-
couraged government to increase their funding (Task Force on Legal Aid, 
197 4; Commission on Clinical Funding, 1978). About half of the more than 
fifty clinics now operating provide specialized services (such as environ-
mental law or worker health and safety) or target particular constitu-
encies (native Canadians, the handicapped, and Spanish-speaking clients). 
Community-elected boards of directors can establish standards for finan-
cial eligibility and criteria for selecting cases. Some clinics form part of 
multiservice centers, which offer clients not only legal assistance but 
also other social and medical services. Canadian clinics employ a larger 
ratio of paraprofessionals to lawyers than do American legal services 
programs, although the ratio has declined in recent years. Most Ontario 
clinics have developed a strategic approach to legal services, involving 
community education, community development, and law reform litigation. 
Yet: most Canadian legal aid remains concerned with the discrete claims 
and readily categorized legal problems .of individual clients. Avrum Lazar 
(n.d.), a federal evaluator of legal aid programs, recently observed: 'When 
money was more readily available, discussions about legal aid concentrated 
on meeting needs. Now discussions focus on controlling cost." 
A British Columbia study concluded that there was little difference in 
the unit cost of criminal defense provided by salaried and private lawyers 
(Brantingham & Burns, 1981). A 1981 study of Quebec's mixed delivery 
system. confirmed the cost-effectiveness of the salaried model, however, 
which . had been demonstrated in an earlier Quebec study (Gervais & 
Cloutier, 1982: 134 and appendices; Maheur, Noiseux Roy et Compagnie, 
1979). The British Columbia and Quebec studies, as well as one in Ontario, 





in criminal matters. Even so, they may remain less expert than salaried 
lawyers. 
Judicare systems generally pay lawyers only 75 percent of market fees. 
This involuntary charitable contribution was intended to express the 
profession's concern for the plight of the poor, but it also assumed that all 
lawyers would participate in legal aid, sharing their collective responsi-
bility equally. Data indicate, however, that less than half of all lawyers 
have remained on the legal aid panels, and the vast majority of those 
handle very few cases (Ribordy, 1982c: 28; Brantingham & Bums, 1981: 
59-60). Ontario recently assessed all lawyers an annual legal aid levy of 
Can$175 to assist in funding increased payments and to legitimate the 
profession's contribution to legal aid. 
Despite the fact that many private practitioners derive virtually all their 
income from judicare, the organized profession barely tolerates the salaried 
legal aid lawyer (Morris & Stern, 1976). Clinic lawyers tend to associate 
primarily with other clinic employees, and employees in thirteen out of 
the forty-seven Ontario clinics have taken the unusual step of seeking 
collective bargaining rights through a union. Private lawyers also per-
ceive their colleagues who specialize in legal aid as being on the fringes 
of the profession. The latter tend to practice in collectives and to locate 
their offices in one area or even one building. Many have been the prime 
movers in the development of 1'left-wing" law groups, such as the Ontario 
Law Union and Lawyers for Social Responsibility (Martin, 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
The cherished notion of a unified profession must give way to the more 
accurate portrait of lawyers divided by function, clientele, and practice 
setting, ranked in terms of prestige and income, differing in their concern 
for anticompetitive restraints, and often disagreeing about professional 
policies and public positions. 
The ideology of professional solidarity does mediate the differences of 
interest and identity, however, enabling the bar to close ranks in the face of 
internal or external threats. This helps to explain the severe sanctions 
imposed for trust violations and other ads of dishonesty, which undermine 
the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client. Devotion to the 
notion of unity also may reinforce the profession's extreme sensitivity to 
any challenge to its independence. 
The Canadian bar continues to manifest the indicia of classic profession-
alism. Perhaps because of the strength of the "professional project," sub-
groups have been slow to assert their distinctive interests and have sub-
mitted to· professional governing bodies dominated by private practi-
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tioners overwhelmingly concerned with market control at the expense of 
innovation and development. The profession's desire to govern legal aid 
programs also reflects its hegemonic tendencies. Its preoccupation with 
preventing the "socialization" of legal services (following the example of 
medicine) retards the emergence of new areas of practice. 
Despite eroding market control, the governing bodies of the Canadian 
bar enjoy greater formal and effective autonomy than do their American 
counterparts. Canadian lawyers have greater immunity from antitrust and 
other regulatory legislation than do those in England. These differences do 
not falsify general theories of the profession, but they do suggest that each 
society has the capacity to mold its own legal profession. Comparative 
examination must be sensitive to these particularities. 
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Tables 
4.1. Percentage of Firms Employing Law Oerks Which Use Them in Particular Activities 
Substantive area 
Title 
Estates searching Corporate Collections 
and and law and (debtor- Civil Criminal 
Fundion Family Wills probate conveyancing securities creditor) Taxation litigation litigation 
Interviewing clients 30 16 21 34 5 19 0 32 35 
Fact gathering 50 16 22 42 18 18 0 43 41 
Preparing pleadings or legal 
documents 20 0 11 22 23 19 0 32 18 
Letter writing 30 5 20 28 18 16 0 37 35 
Filing documents 30 10 27 50 38 24 0 63 53 
Negotiations 0 0 0 8 0 5 0 18 18 
Advocacy 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 6 6 
Dealing with lawyers 20 5 16 45 12 13 0 33 29 
Legal research and analysis 0 0 0 16 10 9 0 25 18 
Search of public records 50 21 37 64 48 20 0 60 47 
Preparing clients' fees and 
disbursements 30 11 20 24 12 14 0 23 24 
(N = 10) (N = 19) (N = 19) (N = 246) (N = 40) (N= 44) (N = 2) (N = 45) (N = 17) 
Sources: Colvin et al. (1978: 249); Zemans (1982). 
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4.2. Geographic Distribution of Canadian Lawyers, 1981 
Province Percent 
Newfoundland 0.8 
Prince Edward Island 0.3 
Nova ScoHa 2.7 






British Columbia 13.1 
Yukon and Territories 0.2 
Source: Statistics Canada (1981). 
1 
4.3. Median Income of Lawyers and Staff by Firm Size, 1979 and 1981 (Can$) 
Number of lawyers in firm 
I 2-6 7-11 12-19 20-29 30+ 
Status 1979 1981 1979 1981 1979 1981 1979 1981 1979 1981 1979 1981 
Partners and proprietors 30,000 30,000 40,000 49,077 59.500 68,284 69,742 90,600 82,525 99,876 93,500 129,021 
Associates - - 20,000 24,000 24,325 30,000 23,868 27,500 26,113 32,440 27,750 40,000 
J\chninistrators - - 16,681 21,750 22,000 24,300 21,710 28,250 - 33,300 - 39,000 
Paralegals 15,000 15,923 13,000 18,100 17,998 16,120 18,365 17,000 17,400 20,500 17,689 
Source: Altman and Weil, Inc. (1982: 14). 
! 
I' 
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4.4. lnterprovincial Mobility of Lawyers 
Percentage of 
lawyers practicing in 
province in 1978 Provinces• 
who were Alb BC Man NB NWT NS Ont Que Sask Yukon 
In same community 
in 1973 83 85 95 86 0 94 94 95 87 67 
In different com-
munity but same 
province in 1973 7 10 3 8 0 4 5 3 8 11 
In different province 
in 1973 10 5 2 6 100 2 1 2 5 22 
"Abbreviations: Alb-Alberta; BC-British Columbia; Man-Manitoba; NB-New Brunswick; 
NS-Nova Scotia; Ont-Ontario; Que-Quebec; Sask- Saskatchewan. 
Source: Berger (1979: 14). 
4.5. Age Distribution of Canadian Lawyers (in Percent), 1931-1981 
Age 
Year 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
1931 27 31 20 13 8 
1941 23 25 26 15 10 
1951 27 25 20 17 10 
1961 34 27 17 11 9 
1971 36 28 17 9 7 
1981 48 26 14 7 3 
Source: Statistics Canada (1931-1981). 
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Year Male female Total total Male 
1931 8,004 54 8,058 1 
1941 7,791 129 7,920 2 -3 
1951 8,841 197 9,038 2 13 
1961 11,759 309 12,068 3 33 
1971 15,535 780 16,315 5 35 
1981 29,030 5,175 34,205 15 87 
Source: Statistics Canada (1931- 1981). 
4.7. Undergraduate Law Students, 1956/57-1979/80 
Year Total number Annual increase, % 
1956/57 2,651 0.7 
1958/59 2,714 1.2 
1959/60 2,710 0.0 
1966/67 4,464 9.2 
1967/68 5,071 13.6 
1968/69 5,735 13.1 
1969/70 6,443 12.3 
1976177 9,204 6.1 
1977/78 9,402 2.2 
1978/79 9,456 0.6 
1979/80 9,590 1.4 
Source: Statistics Canada (1981). 
4.8. Competition to Enter Law School 
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4.9. Annual Revenues of Law Foundations From Interest on Trust Accounts, Can$ 













0 The increase is attributable to high interest rates. 

















4.10. Distribution (in Percent) of Members and Elected Benchers of Law Society of 
Upper Canada, by Firm Size, 1978 
Metropolitan Nonmetropolitan Total 
Firm size Benchers Members Benchers Members Bene hers Members 
1 9.3 11.0 8.0 13.0 17.3 24.0 
2-4 4.0 16.0 18.7 29.0 22.7 45.0 
5-9 6.7 6.0 21.3 9.0 28.0 15.0 
10+ 28.0 13.0 4.0 3.0 32.0 17.0 
Total 48.0 46.0 52.0 54.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Trebilcock et al. (1979). 
4.11. Distribution (in Percent) of Members and Elected Benchers of Law Society of 
Upper Canada, by Employment Context 
Employment context 
Law firm . 
Academic 
Other 
Retired or out of province 
Source: Trebilcock et al. (1979: 209). 
Benchers elected in 
















Books, records, accounts 
Misappropriation (misapplication of clients' money) 
False and misleading statements, documents, records 
Borrowing from clients 
Failure to account to clients 
ConAid of Interest 
Conduct unbecoming 
Failure to carry out clients' instrudions 
Failure to report to client or serve diligenUy 
Failure to respond to LSUC communications 
Admissions and agreed statements 
Total 
Source: Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Reports. 














4.13. Premium for Ontario Errors and Omission Insurance and Claims Experience 
Premium, Can$ Claims per 1,000 lawyers 
1971 100 
1972 110 29.2 
1973 110 37.0 
1974 135 46.3 
1975 135 48.5 
"1976 200 70.0" 
1977 375 49.3 
1978 375 74.3 
1979 450 83.6 
1980 665 96.4 
1981 820 
1982 1,068 
0 Distortion attributable to change in insurer. 
Source: Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Reports; Law Society of Upper Canada (1983b). 
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4.14. Causes of Loss for Payments by Ontario Errors and Omissions Insurance, 1977-1982 
Missed limitation 
Defective search 
Ignorance of law 
Cause 
Failure to follow client's instruction 
Undertakings 
Poor communication with clients 
Conflict-working for two or more parties 
Other 
Total 












Source: Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Report (1982: 155). 
4.15. Law Faculties and Emollments, 1925 
Teachers 
School Full-time Part-time 
Dalhousie 3 20 
McGill 3 12 
Osgoode Hall 3 3 
Saskatchewan 3 2 
Manitoba 3 7 
Montreal 0 17 
Alberta 3 4 
Laval 0 22 
New Brunswick 0 1.7 
Vancouver 0 
























4.16. Costs, Prerequisites, and Length of Legal Training, 1927/28 
College Course Academic 
prerequisite length year Concurrent 
School Tuition, Can$ (years) (years) (weeks) with clerkship 
Alberta 115 2 3 24 No 
Vancouver 15 l 3 24 Yes 
Manitoba 108-118 2 4 28 Yes (2 of 4) 
New Brunswick 102 2 3 24 Yes 
Nova Scotia 162 2 3 29 No 
Ontario 100 2 3 29 Yes 
McGill 162-122 2 3 30 No 
Montreal 160 Degree 3 32.5 Yes 
Laval 125 Degree 3 32.5 Yes 
Saskatchewan 71 2 3 27 No 
Source: Reed (1928). 
4.17. Mean Number of Lawyers and Articling Students by Firm Size, Ontario, 1977 
Toronto Rest of Ontario Total 
Firm size Articling Articling Articling 
(lawyers) Lawyers students Lawyers students Lawyers students 
1 1 0.1 l 0.1 1 0.1 
2-4 2.5 0.3 2.6 0.3 2.5 0.3 
5-9 6.6 1.1 6.1 1.2 6.3 1.1 
10+ 23.4 4.2 12.0 1.6 19.8 3.4 
Source: Colvin et al. (1978: 103). 
4.18. Clientele (in Percent) by Firm Size, Ontario, 1976 
Number Nonpublic 
of corporations and Government 
lawyers Public unincorporated Legal aid Other and 
in firm corporations businesses recipients funding nonprofit Other 
1 3 17 14 61 3 1 
2-4 4 21 11 60 3 1 
5-9 8 30 8 48 5 1 
10+ 16 42 4 33 5 0 
Source: Colvin et al. (1978: 87). 
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4.19. Distribution (in Percent) of Firms by Size of Firm and City, Ontario, 1977 
Firm size (lawyers) 
City size 1 2-4 5-9 
Under 30,000 16.6 20.4 13.7 
30,000-100,000 14.3 17.7 18.0 
100,000-500,000 23.6 24.8 30.2 
500,000+ 45.6 37.1 38.1 
Source: Colvin et al. (1978: 160). 
4.20. Length of Time (in Percent) to Partnership, by Firm Size 
Years to Number of lawyers in firm 
partnership 1 2-5 6-10 10+ 
Under 5 54.5 59.8 34.3 14.3 
5 36.4 26.8 40.0 51.4 
Over 5 9.1 13.4 25.7 34.3 










4.21. Income of Lawyers by Experience and Firm Size, 1985, Can$ 
Year of 1 Partner 2-5 Partners 6-10 Partners 11 Partners or more 
admission Partners Associates Partners Assodates Partners Associates Partners Associates · 
1984 25,200 21,000 26,200 
1983 50,300 29,100 28,400 32,600 
1982 57,400 35,000 27,700 37,400 
1981 50,300 33,300 37,200 41,000 
1980 49,200 
1979 65,900 
1978 72,400 86,300 
1977 
1974-1976 47,500 73,800 45,400a 85,000 39,800" 107,300 
1970-1973 73,700 91,700 120,900 
1964-1969 90,400 90,300 136,200 
Before 1964 98,900 94,300 145,000 
4 Prior to 1978 
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4.22. Distribution of Legal Aid Payments by Lawyer, Ontario, 1985 
Amount paid (Can$) Number of lawyers Percent of lawyers paid 
1-1,000 J,329 27.3 
1,000-5,000 1,671 34.3 
5 ,000-10,000 730 15.0 
10,000-20,000 589 12.l 
20,000-30,000 241 4.9 
30,000-40,000 119 2.4 
Over 40,000 191 4.0 
Source: Law Society of Upper Canada (1985: 17). 
NOTES 
We wish to thank David Stager of the University of Toronto Department of 
Economics for his guidance regarding statistical data and Richard Abel, Phil!p 
Lewis, and Terrence Halliday for their encouragement stimulation, and frank 
criticism. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in 1986 American Bar Founda-
tion Research Journal 447. 
1. Notaries Act, Rev. Stat. Quebec 1977, c. N-2. The Quebec notary "becomes 
the confidential advisor in family affairs; he is entrusted with the winding up and 
management of estates; makes reports on titles, secures charters for joint stock 
companies; receives oaths and statutory declarations; ads as legal advisor for 
his clients; negotiates loans and ads as agent for the sale of real estate" (Cana-
dian Law List, 1985: 1158-1159). In all other Canadian provinces, except British 
Columbia, notaries are limited to taking affidavits; "notarizing" documents (i.e., 
attesting them to be true); and drawing, passing, or issuing deeds and contracts 
(see, e.g., Ontario's Notaries Ad:, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 319, s. 34). All 
lawyers in private practice and most lawyers employed by governments or 
corporations also hold an appointment as a notary. Nonlawyer notaries usually 
are corporate officers or in businesses such as travel agencies, where notarization 
of documents frequently is required. The Professional Organizations Committee 
estimated that there were 552 nonlawyer notaries in Ontario. 
2. Provincial law societies provide for readmission (see, e.g., Law Society 
Regulations, Law Society of Upper Canada (1975], ss. 30[2], 31). However, they 
limit the· return of judges or government administrators to avoid conflicts of 
interest .(see, e.g., Manitoba Professional Conduct Handbook, 1982: 64; Barreau de 
Quebec, 1976: s. 99 [a]). 
3. See Laskin (1969) and Fowler (1978). In Ontario, any lawyer in good 




apply. There has been no limit on the number of appointments and no require-
ment to canvass the views of the profession or the judiciary. Roberts (1984) 
estimated that 3,000 of the province's 16,000. lawyers were Queen's Counsel. In 
1986 the provincial government generated considerable controversy by announc-
ing that it would cease to recommend further appointments and was abolishing 
existing titles retroactively. 
4. Zemans (1986: 9-10) found that the ratio of community legal workers to 
lawyers in Ontario legal aid clinics was slightly greater than 2: 1 in 1980, but by 
1984 it had dropped to 1.6: 1. 
5. Altman and Weil, Inc. (1980: 14) found that there were 0.23 paralegals per 
lawyer in Canada compared to 0.17 in the United States. The highest ratio is in 
Ontario (0.25) and the lowest, in Quebec (0.10). Small firms and sole practitioners 
have a higher ratio than do large firms. 
6. See, for example, Statutory Powers Procedures Act, Rev. Stat. Ontario 
1980, c. 484, s. 10; Rules of the Provincial Court (Civil Division), Ontario Reg. 
797 I 84; Criminal Code, Rev. Stat. Canada 1970, c. 34, s. 7 35. There are no rules 
permitting Canadian law students to appear in superior courts. A study of Toronto 
labor arbitration between 1971 and 1973 revealed that trade unions use lawyers in 
approximately one-third of cases- 42 percent where an employee has been 
discharged. In all other cases, a union representative appeared for the member 
(Goldblatt, 197 4: 30-42). 
7. In determining the "real market" for legal services it is necessary to consider 
the effect on aggregate demand of corporate as well as individual clients, of 
changing intensities of legal regulation, and of overall fluctuations in economic 
activity. 
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